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Abstract 
If interpreted in a strict legal sense, beneficial ownership rules in tax treaties would have no effect on conduit companies 
because companies at law own their property and income beneficially.  Conversely, a company can never own anything in a 
substantive sense because economically a company is no more than a congeries of arrangements that represents the people 
behind it.  Faced with these contradictory considerations, people have adopted surrogate tests that they attempt to employ in 
place of the treaty test of beneficial ownership.  An example is that treaty benefits should be limited to companies that are both 
resident in the states that are parties to the treaty and that carry on substantive business activity.  The test is inherently illogical.  
The origins of the substantive business activity test appear to lie in analogies drawn with straw company and base company 
cases.  Because there is no necessary relationship between ownership and activity, the test of substantive business activity can 
never provide a coherent surrogate for the test of beneficial ownership.  The article finishes with a Coda that summarises 
suggestions for reform to be made in work that is to follow. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 
1.1 Double Taxation 
Most countries tax income on the basis of both residence and source.1 As a result, cross-
border transactions risk being taxed twice, both in the source country and in the country 
of residence.  This is known as double taxation.  One response is for states that have 
                                                 
* This article builds on a theme in Saurabh Jain, Effectiveness of the Beneficial Ownership Test in Conduit 
Company Cases (IBFD  Amsterdam,  2013).    Some  text  is  developed  from  material  in  Dr  Jain’s  book,  and  
several transaction diagrams originally appeared in the book.  Translations from foreign judgments and 
statutes that are not available in English are by Saurabh Jain, with the assistance of Kevin Holmes, Nicole 
Schlegel, René Andersen, Sarah Binder and Stephan Gerschewski, whose help is very gratefully 
acknowledged, as is the permission of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. 
† BA, LLB (Hons) National Law Institute University, Bhopal; LLM Aberdeen, PhD, Victoria University of 
Wellington, Lecturer in Law, University of New England. 
‡ BA, LLB (Hons) Auckland, BCL Oxon, JSD Cornell, Inner Temple, Barrister, Professor and former Dean 
of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, Gastprofessor, Institut für Österreichisches und Internationales 
Steuerrecht, Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien; Adjunct Senior Research Fellow, Monash University, 
Melbourne. 
§ BCA, LLB (Hons) Victoria University of Wellington, Law Clerk, Wellington. 
1 For example, the Income Tax Act 2007 (New Zealand) provides that both the worldwide income of a New 
Zealand tax resident and New Zealand sourced income are subject to New Zealand tax laws. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2476243 
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trading or investment relationships to enter treaties, known as ‘double tax treaties’, 
whereby the states that are parties to the treaty each agree to restrict their substantive 
tax law to ensure that income is not taxed twice.  Double tax treaties are also known as 
‘double tax conventions’ or ‘agreements’.2 Most double tax agreements hew broadly to 
the form of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital3 promulgated by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, known as the OECD Model 
Convention.  This model, and most treaties, contain articles that address the taxation of 
dividends, interest and royalties, collectively known as ‘passive income’.4 
Where passive income flows from a source in one treaty partner to a resident of another 
treaty partner double tax treaties usually partially or fully exempt the income from 
withholding tax imposed by the state of source.  For example, subject to Articles 10(3) 
and 10(4), Article 10(2) of the Convention between New Zealand and the United States 
of America limits the tax that contracting states may levy on dividends paid by 
companies that are resident within their jurisdiction where the dividends are beneficially 
owned by residents of the other contracting state.5  Understandably, the intention of the 
contracting states is that only their own residents will obtain treaty benefits.  It is 
possible, however, for residents of a non-contracting state to obtain the benefits of a tax 
treaty by interposing a company in a contracting state, a company that subsequently 
forwards passive income to the residents of the non-contracting state.  This scheme 
subverts the intention of the contracting states to confine benefits to their own residents.  
Companies interposed in this manner are sometimes called ‘conduit companies’.  
Conduit company cases usually turn on whether the company in question should be 
characterised as the beneficial owner of passive income that it receives, or as a conduit 
that merely forwards passive income to people who are not residents of one of the states 
that are parties to the treaty in question. 
1.2  Conduit Companies, Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Personality 
Conduit companies are able to obtain treaty benefits because of two factors.  First, 
people establishing companies destined to serve as conduit companies contrive to 
ensure that the conduit qualifies as resident in the jurisdiction of a treaty partner 
pursuant to the residence rules of the partner in question.  Ordinarily, this objective can 
be achieved by simply incorporating the company in the state in question.  Take, for 
instance, the Mauritius Income Tax Act 1995.  Section 73 of that Act provides that a 
company that is ‘resident’ in Mauritius means a company incorporated in Mauritius.  
Secondly, as far as companies are concerned, treaties operate on a formal, legalistic 
basis rather than on a substantive basis.6 
                                                 
2 An example is the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion 
with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-N.Z., July 23, 1982, 35 U.S.T. 1949 [hereinafter U.S.-N.Z. 
Convention] updated by protocols in 1983 and 2010. 
3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [hereinafter OECD] Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2010).  
4 For example, Art. 10, 11 and 12 of the U.S.-N.Z. Convention, supra note 2, address the taxation of 
dividends, interest and royalties respectively. 
5 U.S.-N.Z. Convention, supra note 2. 
6 See OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, Commentary on Article 10 concerning the Taxation of 
Dividends, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 186, para. 1 (2010):  ‘Under the laws 
of the OECD member countries, such joint stock companies are legal entities with a separate juridical 
personality distinct from all their shareholders’. 
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By virtue of these factors, a company established in a country that is a party to a treaty 
takes advantage of the benefits that the treaty confers on residents even though in 
substance the company is acting on behalf of a resident of a third country. 
The OECD Model Convention, and treaties that are drafted in accordance with it, 
attempt to frustrate this strategy by anti-avoidance rules that limit relevant treaty 
benefits to a resident who derives income as the ‘beneficial owner’7 of that income.  
Treaties sometimes use terms such as ‘beneficially entitled’,8 and ‘beneficially owned’9 
in order to achieve the same result.  Thus, Articles 10(2), 11(2) and 12(2) of the OECD 
Model Convention respectively limit treaty benefits to a recipient who is the ‘beneficial 
owner’ of the dividends, interest, or royalties in question.  As the following paragraphs 
of this article will argue, the problem is that, as a matter of linguistic logic, of company 
law, and of economic analysis, the expression ‘beneficial owner’ is not capable of 
fulfilling the anti-avoidance role that treaties assign to it.  
From an economic perspective, conduit companies are not capable of owning income 
beneficially.  The object of a company is to make profits for the benefit of its 
shareholders.  It is merely a vehicle through which shareholders derive income.  As 
Thuronyi has pointed out, in substance a company is no more capable of beneficially 
owning anything than it is capable of having a blood group.10 Thus, a conduit company 
is not beneficially entitled to treaty benefits.  Rather, it is the shareholders, residents of 
a non-contracting state, who substantially enjoy the benefit of passive income.  It 
follows that in order to ensure that a resident of a contracting state who claims treaty 
benefits is entitled to treaty benefits in substance, double tax agreements should be 
interpreted in a substantive economic sense. 
Nevertheless, the traditional and formal legal view is that companies have separate legal 
personality, and are therefore not only the legal but also the beneficial owners of their 
income.  The observations of Justice Pitney in the case of Eisner v Macomber11 reflect 
this view.  Although Eisner v Macomber did not concern the issue of beneficial 
ownership of assets by companies, Justice Pitney observed that companies hold both 
legal and beneficial title to their assets:12 
…    [T]he interest of the stockholder is a capital interest, and his certificates of 
stock   are   but   the   evidence   of   it  …   Short   of   liquidation,   or   until   dividend  
declared, he has no right to withdraw any part of either capital or profits from 
the common enterprise; on the contrary, his interest pertains not to any part, 
divisible or indivisible, but to the entire assets, business, and affairs of the 
company.  Nor is it the interest of an owner in the assets themselves, since the 
corporation has full title, legal and equitable, to the whole. 
The Commentary on the OECD Model Convention follows this approach.  The 
Commentary explains that double tax agreements recognise the legal personality of 
                                                 
7 E.g. Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, Indon.-Neth., art. 10(2), Jan. 29, 2002), 2287 U.N.T.S. 107. 
8 E.g. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect 
to Taxes on Income, Austl.-Can., art. 10(1),   May 21, 1980, 1334 U.N.T.S 235. 
9 E.g. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Neth.-U.K., art.  10(1), Nov. 7, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S 209. 
10 Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 78 (1990). 
11 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 193 (1920). 
12 Id. at 206, emphasis added.  
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companies.13 From the perspective of legal analysis and of the meaning of the word 
‘ownership’, it follows that conduit companies are the beneficial owners of income that 
they derive and are entitled to treaty benefits. 
1.3  Surrogate Tests of Beneficial Ownership 
Courts appreciated that the beneficial ownership test was intended to frustrate conduit 
company arrangements.  However, in the light of the traditional legalistic view of 
companies, and of the meaning of ‘ownership’, it seems that courts decided that they 
were unable to apply the beneficial ownership test literally.  As a result, in order to 
prevent residents of non-contracting states from obtaining treaty benefits by means of 
the interposition of conduit companies, courts adopted two surrogate tests in place of 
the literal beneficial ownership test.  These surrogate tests focus not on ownership of 
income by the company in question but on some other factual matter that is thought to 
be relevant.  The tests can be categorised as ‘substantive business activity’ and 
‘dominion’.  ‘Dominion’ may be used to refer to such concepts as effective control of 
a company.  These surrogate tests have not only been used by courts to decide conduit 
company cases, but have also been embodied in statute by some legislatures.  This 
present article focuses on the first of the surrogate tests, the test of substantive business 
activity.  The authors plan a second article on dominion. 
1.4  Substantive Business Activity Test 
The substantive business activity test examines whether a company carries out its own 
business activity.  It is also referred to as the ‘substantive business operations’14 test or 
‘economic activity’15 test.  Originally, courts developed the substantive business 
activity test as a substance over form rule to determine whether the law should recognise 
domestic straw companies and foreign base companies as separate taxable entities.  
Since about 1987, the OECD, the German legislature, and the courts have extended the 
application of the substantive business activity test.  The OECD included the 
substantive business activity test in the Commentary on its Model Convention on 
Income and Capital.16 The German legislature has incorporated the substantive business 
activity test into s 50d(3) of the German Income Tax Act, which is a specific anti-
avoidance rule aimed at preventing abuse of double tax treaties.  Courts often use the 
substantive business activity test to decide conduit company cases.17 
This article argues that substantive business activity should not be considered to be an 
indicator of beneficial ownership because there is a logical contradiction in using the 
presence of activity, substantive or not, to indicate ownership of any kind, let alone 
beneficial ownership.  Even if one assumes that the fact that a company does not carry 
out a substantive business activity may indicate that a company lacks substance, and 
therefore cannot beneficially own income, the presence of business activity does not 
logically show that a company does beneficially own income sourced from another 
                                                 
13 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, Commentary on Article 1 concerning the Persons Covered by 
the Convention, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 45 (2010). 
14 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Conduit 
Companies, in INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES (ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, NO 1) 87, para.  42(ii) (1987) [hereinafter Conduit Companies Report]. 
15 Einkommensteuergesetz [ESTG][Income Tax Act], Oct. 16, 1934, REICHSGESETZBLATT, Teil I [RGBL.  
I] at 1005, § 50d(3)  (Ger.). 
16 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 6. 
17 See, e.g., N.  Indiana  Pub.    Serv.  Co.  v.  Comm’r 105 T.C. 341 (1995) (discussed in detail below). 
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country.  That is, there is no necessary link between substantive business activity and 
beneficial ownership.18 A company may carry out a substantive business activity, but 
have the additional purpose of forwarding income to a resident of a non-contracting 
state, and, therefore, not be the beneficial owner of the income. 
This article also argues that by treating substantive business activity as a sufficient 
criterion for entitlement to treaty benefits, courts have sometimes recognised even tax 
avoidance as a substantive business activity.  In summary, courts use substantive 
business activity to indicate beneficial ownership, but, when analysed carefully, OECD 
reports19 and cases support the argument that there is no logical link between substantive 
business activity and beneficial ownership. 
1.5  The Substantive Business Activity Test in the OECD Commentary and Reports 
The Conduit Companies Report20 and the OECD Commentary21 set out certain 
provisions that negotiators may include in double tax treaties to frustrate conduit 
company schemes.  These provisions will be referred to as ‘safeguard provisions’.  The 
object of these safeguard provisions is to ensure that the entity that is claiming treaty 
benefits owns, controls, or is ultimately entitled to the income in question.  That is, the 
focus of these provisions is on substantive economic ownership or beneficial 
ownership.  One safeguard provision sets out this ‘look-through’22 approach.  
According to this approach: 
A company that is a resident of a Contracting State shall not be entitled to 
relief from taxation under this Convention with respect to any item of income, 
gains, or profits if it is owned or controlled directly or through one or more 
companies, wherever resident, by persons who are not residents of a 
Contracting State. 
This safeguard provision focuses on determining who has ownership or control of 
income, gains or profits.  If the word ‘owned’ in this provision merely referred to legal 
ownership of the income in question, the provision would be illogical because the 
company unquestionably legally owns its income.  In this provision, ‘owned’ must refer 
to substantive economic ownership or to beneficial ownership, reflecting the intention 
of treaty partners to limit treaty benefits to residents of contracting states. 
Such safeguard provisions have a broad scope in the sense that they apply to a wide 
range of situations.  Thus, there is a danger that the provisions will prevent a company 
claiming treaty benefits when it is genuinely entitled to them.  The OECD Commentary 
and Report therefore recommend that the safeguard provisions should be applied with 
certain provisions that aim to ensure that treaty benefits are granted in genuine 
situations.  The OECD Commentary and Report refer to these provisions as ‘bona fide 
provisions’.  For the purposes of this article, the most important bona fide provision is 
the ‘activity provision’, which states that the safeguard provisions: 
…   shall not apply where the company is engaged in substantive business 
operations in the Contracting State of which it is a resident and the relief from 
                                                 
18 See supra Part 1.6 
19 See supra Part 1,6. 
20 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 14, at para. 42(ii). 
21 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 13, at para. 13. 
22 Id. at para.13. See also Conduit Companies Report, supra note 14, at para. 23.  
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taxation claimed from the other Contracting State is with respect to income 
that is connected with such operations. 
The effect of this provision is that the look through approach and other safeguard 
provisions that attempt to frustrate conduit company schemes will not apply where a 
company is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of a treaty partner 
provided that the income in question is connected with those operations.  For instance, 
where there is a treaty between states B and C, it would appear that a bank that is 
resident in state B may claim relief in respect of interest received from State C even if 
the  bank’s  shareholders  reside  in  state  A  and  even  if  economically  the  bank’s  loan  to  a  
state C resident was funded by a deposit in the bank by a resident of state A.23 
The natural corollary of this provision is that where a company carries out a substantive 
business activity the company is entitled to claim treaty benefits, whether or not the 
company is the substantive economic or beneficial owner of the income.  Essentially, 
the substantive business activity criterion determines entitlement to treaty benefits and 
therefore overrides the substantive economic ownership requirement imported by the 
safeguard provisions.  The OECD Model Convention and Commentary thus treat 
substantive business activity as in effect changing the incidence of ownership because 
they proceed on the basis that substantive business activity is somehow indicative of 
ownership of income; that is, that there is a logical link between substantive business 
activity and beneficial ownership. 
1.6  Lack of Logic and the Substantive Business Activity Approach 
Paragraph 119 of the 1998 report of the OECD on Harmful Tax Competition24 also 
seems to proceed on the assumption that there is a logical link between substantive 
business activity and beneficial ownership.  Paragraph 119 states that companies with 
no economic function incorporated in tax havens can be denied treaty benefits because 
these companies are not considered to be the beneficial owners of certain income 
formally attributed to them.  This statement that companies without an ‘economic 
function’ or substantive business activity cannot be beneficial owners of income 
suggests that there is a causative relationship between substantive business activity and 
beneficial ownership.  However, as argued in Part 1.4, it is illogical to use substantive 
business activity as an indicator of beneficial ownership.  The reason is that the mere 
absence of business activity does not logically prevent a person from owning anything.  
But even if one assumes that the absence of business activity is a robust indicator of 
lack of beneficial ownership, the presence of business activity does not logically show 
that a company does own income beneficially.  
The following example, elaborated from the example three paragraphs above, illustrates 
the argument.  There are three jurisdictions, A, B, and C. C charges withholding tax on 
outward flowing interest.  There is a standard form tax treaty between B and C, which 
eliminates tax on interest that flows between residents of those jurisdictions but there is 
no other relevant treaty.  Investor is a resident of A.  He owns Bank, a banking company 
that is incorporated in and that carries on business in B.  In a separate transaction, 
                                                 
23 This hypothetical case is similar in relevant respects to Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de 
l'Industrie v. Société Bank of Scotland, 9  I.T.L.R. 683 (2006) considered in Part 6.9 of this article. 
24 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 
(1998). 
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Investor lends money at interest to Borrower, a resident of C. C charges withholding 
tax on the interest that Borrower pays to Investor. 
In order to avoid the withholding tax charged by C, Investor rearranges his loan.  Now, 
Investor lends to Bank, his company in B, which on-lends to Borrower in C.  When 
Borrower pays interest to Bank, Borrower and Bank claim the benefit of the B-C treaty.  
Bank is not a mere conduit.  It carries on a substantial banking business.  But should 
this activity qualify Bank for exemption from tax imposed by C on the outward flowing 
interest?  The answer should be ‘no’, because the substantive owner of the interest is 
Investor, a resident of A.  But legally, as an independent legal personality, Bank owns 
the interest.  Bank certainly carries on a substantive business and the interest appears to 
be connected with the operations of that business.  Should this business qualify Bank to 
benefit under the B-C treaty in respect of interest that Investor owns in an economic 
sense?  To grant this benefit to Bank would be contrary to the intent of the B-C treaty, 
because the economic beneficiary of the exemption is Investor, who is not a resident of 
one of the states that are parties to the treaty.  This example illustrates that there is no 
logical link between beneficial ownership and substantive business activity. 
On April 29, 2011, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD published a discussion 
draft, ‘Clarification of the Meaning of   ‘Beneficial  Owner’   in   the  OECD Model Tax 
Convention’.25 As its name suggests, the draft attempts to address difficulties with 
interpreting ‘beneficial owner’.  It does so by putting forward possible amendments to 
some of the clauses in the Commentary to Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention.  The draft offers some insight into some of the problems of applying 
the Model to passive income, but as the present authors read it, the draft does not address 
the fundamental illogicality of treating activity as an indicium of ownership.  The draft 
therefore sheds little light on the problems thrown up by the example discussed here.  
Part 7 of this article visits other aspects of the discussion draft. 
The Swiss case of A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration26 further illustrates that 
there is no logical link between beneficial ownership and substantive business activity.  
2. BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP, SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS ACTIVITY AND ABUSE OF LAW BEFORE 
THE SWISS COURTS 
2.1  A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration: Facts 
A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration involved a group of companies that were 
controlled by Mr E, a resident of Bermuda.  Mr E was the director of D Ltd, a Bermudian 
corporation.  D Ltd held all the shares in C Ltd, a subsidiary in the Channel Islands.  C 
Ltd in turn wholly owned A Holding ApS (A Holding), a Danish holding company.  A 
Holding was the taxpayer.  It acquired the entire issued share capital of F AG, a Swiss 
company.  A Holding did not have its own offices or staff in Denmark, and had no 
entries for assets, leasing or personnel expenditure in its books.  F AG distributed 
dividends to A Holding, which were subjected to a 35 per cent withholding tax under 
Swiss tax law. 
 
                                                 
25 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, CLARIFICATION OF THE MEANING OF ‘BENEFICIAL OWNER’ IN THE 
OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION: DISCUSSION DRAFT (2011). 
26 A Holding ApS v. Fed. Tax Admin., 8 I.T.L.R. 536 (2005) (Federal Court, Switz.). 
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Figure 1: A Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration 
 
A Holding applied for a refund of the withholding tax under Article 26(2) of the 
Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty of 23 November 1973.27 The Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration  and  the  Higher  Tax  Administration  rejected  A  Holding’s  application. 
Since the Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty did not have a beneficial ownership 
provision28 both courts applied the abuse of law doctrine.29 They found that A Holding 
did not carry out a real economic activity.  They therefore held that A Holding was 
interposed solely for the purpose of obtaining benefits of the treaty.  The Higher Tax 
Administration, however, considered A Holding to be the beneficial owner of the 
dividends.  The Swiss Federal Court confirmed the decision of the Higher Tax 
                                                 
27 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Fortune, Den.–
Switz., art.  26(2), Nov. 23, 1973, 958 U.N.S.T. 27 [hereinafter Den.-Switz. Double Taxation Agreement].  
It provides, ‘ …  the   tax  withheld   (at   the   source)   shall  be   reimbursed  upon  application,   in   so   far  as   the  
levying thereof is restricted by the Agreement.’ 
28 The beneficial ownership requirement was introduced to the Den.-Switz. Double Taxation Agreement, 
id., in August 2009. 
29 See generally, Zoë Prebble & John Prebble, Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of Income Tax 
Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of Abuse of Law, BULL.  FOR INT’L TAX’N 151 (2008). 
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Administration and explained its reasons for applying the abuse of law doctrine and the 
substantive business activity test. 
2.2  Abuse of Law and Beneficial Ownership 
On appeal before the Swiss Federal Court, A Holding argued that in the absence of a 
beneficial ownership provision in the Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty the abuse 
of law doctrine could not be read into the treaty.  Secondly, A Holding argued that it 
was the beneficial owner of the dividend, which, it argued, excluded the application of 
the abuse of law doctrine.30  
The  Federal  Court  rejected  A  Holding’s  first  argument,  and  held  that  the  abuse  of  law  
doctrine could be read into the Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty because the 
doctrine was consistent with the aim and purpose of the OECD Model Convention.  
In relation  to  A  Holding’s  second  argument,  the court accepted that A Holding was the 
beneficial owner of the dividend, but observed:31 
Although the Higher Tax Administration has regarded [A Holding] as the 
beneficial owner of the dividends in accordance with art 10 [of the 
Switzerland-Denmark double tax treaty] one can assume an abuse.  The 
assumptions of the court of lower instance were based on the fact that the 
distributed dividends are in principle attributable to [A Holding] for taxation 
in  Denmark  …  this  does not answer the question whether the convention was 
invoked  abusively  … 
This observation suggests that the court distinguished between the beneficial ownership 
test and the domestic anti-abuse principle, because the court held that although A 
Holding was the beneficial owner of the dividend, this finding did not preclude the 
application of the anti-abuse principle.  Furthermore,  the  court’s  analysis  shows  that the 
deciding principle in the case was the abuse of law doctrine, not beneficial ownership.  
2.3  Abuse of Law and Substantive Business Activity 
In the process of applying the abuse of law doctrine, the Swiss Federal Court based its 
decision on the criterion of whether there was a relevant business activity. 
As discussed in Part 1.5 of this article, the commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model 
Convention32 recommends certain provisions that negotiators may include in double tax 
treaties in order to frustrate conduit company schemes.  This article refers to these 
provisions as ‘safeguard provisions’.  Part 1.5 of this article discussed the ‘look through’ 
provision as an example of a safeguard provision.  Since the Switzerland-Denmark 
double tax treaty had no beneficial ownership provision, the Swiss Federal Court in A 
Holding implemented the abuse of law doctrine using the look-through provision, 
which it referred to as the ‘transparency provision’,33 to determine whether A Holding 
was entitled to treaty benefits.  The transparency provision had not been incorporated 
into the treaty.  In a broad-brush exercise of treaty interpretation the Federal Court 
simply took the transparency provision from the Commentary on the Model 
                                                 
30 A Holding ApS, 8 I.T.L.R. at 554. 
31 Id. at 559. 
32 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 13. 
33 See supra Part 1.5 for quotation of the ‘look-through’ or ‘transparency’ provision. 
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Convention34 and applied it to the case, almost as if it was a rule in its own right.35  
Applying the transparency provision, the court recognised that the corporate structure 
allowed Mr E to control A Ltd.  Therefore, any refund would go directly to Mr E, a 
resident of a non-contracting state.36 
As discussed in Part 1.5 of this article, the OECD Model Convention recommendations 
suggest that courts should apply safeguard provisions to limit the grant of treaty benefits 
to bona fide situations.  In this case, the Court applied the ‘look through’ provision 
together with the substantive business activity approach.  It observed: 37 
If the convention does not contain an explicit anti-abuse provision-[as] in the 
present case-an abuse can, based on the transparency provision, only be 
assumed if [A Holding] additionally does not carry out a real economic 
activity or an active business activity  …  It   follows  that  the  objection  of  an  
abuse of a convention is unfounded if the company demonstrates that its main 
purpose, its management and the acquisition as well as the holding of 
participations and other assets from which the income in question arises is 
primarily based on valid economic grounds and not aimed at the obtaining of 
advantages   of   the   applicable   double   tax   convention   (so   called   ‘bona-fide’-
provision). The same applies if the company pursues effectively a commercial 
activity in its state of residence and the tax relief claimed in the other 
contracting state relates to income connected to this activity (so-called activity 
provision). 
The court found that A Holding was not engaged in a business activity and therefore 
held that A Holding was not entitled to a withholding tax refund under the Switzerland-
Denmark double tax treaty.  The observation of the court that an abuse of law ‘can ... 
only be assumed if’ a company does not carry out a substantive business activity 
suggests that the court viewed the presence or absence of substantive business activity 
as the overriding factor in determining whether the abuse of law doctrine applied: that 
is, that there is a logical link between substantive business activity and an abuse of law. 
2.4  Beneficial Ownership, Abuse of Law and Substantive Business Activity: Separate Tests? 
In A Holding, the Swiss Federal Court considered the abuse of law doctrine to be 
separate from the beneficial ownership test, because, although the court considered A 
Holding to be the beneficial owner of the dividend, this conclusion did not preclude the 
application of the abuse of law doctrine.  The Swiss Federal Court also considered the 
absence of substantive business activity to be an indicator of an abuse of law, because 
it stated that an abuse of law could only be assumed if there was a lack of business 
activity.  A natural inference is that in the opinion of the court, beneficial ownership 
(which was found to be present) and substantive business activity (which was found to 
be absent) are two different tests.  The decision of the Federal Court therefore suggests 
that there is no logical link between the criterion of substantive business activity and 
the criterion of beneficial ownership.  On the other hand, it is difficult to reconcile the 
decision of the Swiss Federal Court that A Holding was a conduit company with the 
finding by the Higher Tax Administration that A Holding was the beneficial owner of 
                                                 
34 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 13, at para. 13. 
35 A Holding ApS, 8 I.T.L.R. at 560. 
36 Id. at 560. 
37 Id. (emphasis added). 
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the dividend.  It seems that the Higher Tax Administration applied the beneficial 
ownership test in a formal, legalistic manner.  That is, the Higher Tax Administration 
took the view that a company was capable of being the beneficial owner of dividends, 
in contrast to the substantive economic view of ownership, that is that shareholders are 
the beneficial owners of dividends. 
3.5  Should Business Activity be a Sufficient Criterion for Deciding Conduit Company Cases? 
As discussed in Part 2.3 of this article, in A Holding the court held that, in the absence 
of an explicit anti-abuse provision, abuse of a treaty ‘can  …  only  be  assumed  if  [the  
company   in   question]  …   does   not   carry   out   a   real   economic   activity   or   an   active  
business   activity  …’38 As further explained in Part 2.3, this formulation of the rule 
seems to have led the court and judges to think that the presence of ‘real economic 
activity or an active business activity’ is sufficient to dispel the contention that an 
intermediary is a mere conduit. 
The business activity test may have led the court to the correct conclusion in this conduit 
company case.  It is illogical, however, to base the decision in conduit company cases 
solely on the presence or absence of business activity.  The fundamental error of logic 
is that the presence of business activity that is connected with the passive income that 
is in issue does not necessarily mean that an interposed company should not be classed 
as a conduit company.  Nevertheless, courts have considered substantive business 
activity to be a sufficient criterion for deciding conduit company cases.  (One might add 
that it is equally illogical to conclude that whether there is an abuse in fact depends on 
whether the relevant law—that is, the treaty—includes an anti-abuse provision).  For 
this reason, it is important to examine the rationale behind decisions involving conduit 
companies. 
3. WAS SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS ACTIVITY ORIGINALLY A TEST FOR DECIDING CONDUIT 
COMPANY CASES? 
3.1  Introduction 
The argument in the following parts of this article has several strands.  This paragraph 
and the next attempt to provide an introductory guide to that argument.  Originally 
courts did not develop the substantive business activity test for conduit company cases.  
It was a substance over form test developed for cases involving foreign ‘base 
companies’.  United States courts have also applied the substantive business activity 
test for determining tax issues in cases involving domestic ‘straw companies’.  The 
paragraphs that follow cite examples of both these categories.  Base company cases and 
straw company cases tend to turn on whether the companies in question are taxable 
entities separate from their shareholders.  Courts have generally treated the presence or 
absence of business activity as a sufficient criterion to determine that issue. 
Tax planning schemes involving base companies and straw companies resemble 
conduit company cases.  The reason is that the corporate structures used by taxpayers 
to obtain a tax advantage are similar.  As a result, the courts have transposed the 
application of the substantive business activity test from straw company and base 
company cases to conduit company cases.  They have failed to recognise, however, that 
a conduit company case turns on a completely different issue.  The issue in conduit 
                                                 
38 Id. 
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company cases is whether the shareholders of the conduit company are the substantive 
economic owners of the income of the company such that the company is entitled to the 
benefits of a tax treaty.  On that basis, a conduit company case cannot be determined 
solely by the application of the substantive business activity test.  Before explaining the 
distinction, it is helpful to describe straw companies and base companies. 
3.2  Straw companies  
‘Straw companies’ or ‘nominee companies’ are often used for non-tax reasons in 
business transactions involving real estate.  In the present context, the word ‘straw’ in 
the expression ‘straw companies’ is a United States usage.  A straw company merely 
holds legal title to a property.  Its shareholders, or a third party, beneficially own the 
property. 
Non-tax reasons for employing a straw company may include: avoidance of personal 
liability for loans obtained to acquire, improve or refinance property in real estate 
ventures;39 protection from the claims of creditors of the beneficial owners of the 
property transferred to the company;40 facilitation of management or conveyance of 
property owned by a group of investors;41 and concealment of the identity of the 
beneficial owners of the property.42  
Beneficial owners of property of straw companies anticipate that courts will ignore the 
existence of the company or will recognise the   company’s agency status when 
attributing income, gains or losses.  If courts treat a straw company as a separate taxable 
entity there may be adverse tax consequences.  For example, property dealings between 
the company and its shareholders may result in taxable gains or losses of holding 
periods.  Income and losses from the property may be attributed to the company during 
the time it holds the property, and shareholders may not be able to deduct those losses 
when they eventually receive income from the property. 
In attempting to escape these adverse tax consequences, taxpayers argue that courts 
should disregard straw companies for tax purposes.  They   argue   that   a   company’s  
activities are not sufficient to justify its treatment as a separate taxable entity.43 That is, 
the courts apply a substantive business activity test to determine whether a straw 
company is a separate taxable entity. 
3.3  Difference between Straw Company Cases and Conduit Company Cases 
Both straw companies and conduit companies, as legal owners of income, forward the 
income to their shareholders, who are generally the beneficial owners.  Prima facie the 
two situations are similar.  However, they involve two very different issues. 
In straw company cases, courts are aware that a straw company is not the beneficial 
owner  of  the  company’s  property.  The issue is, rather, whether a company exists as a 
taxable entity separate from its shareholders, so that the company can be regarded as 
the recipient of the income for tax purposes.  In contrast, in conduit company cases, 
courts are not concerned with whether the company incorporated in a foreign 
                                                 
39 E.g., Bruce L. Schlosberg v. U.S., 81-1 U.S.T.C (CCH) P9272 (1981). 
40 E.g., Moline Properties Inc.  v.  Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
41 E.g., Roccaforte  v.  Comm’r, 77 T.C. 263 (5th Cir. 1981). 
42 E.g., Jones  v.  Comm’r, 640 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1981). 
43 E.g., Nat’l  Carbide  Corp.  v.  Comm’r 336 U.S. 422 (1949).  Taxpayers may accept the existence of the 
company as a separate tax entity, but argue that the straw company acts on their behalf as an agent. 
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jurisdiction is a separate taxable entity.  The issue is whether the company owns passive 
income beneficially.  
In conduit company cases, courts also decide effectively to ignore or to recognise the 
existence of an intermediary company for tax purposes.  However, this decision is a 
consequence of the application of the beneficial ownership test.  In straw company 
cases, on the other hand, this decision is a result of the application of the substantive 
business activity test.  
The point is that the presence of a substantive business activity may be sufficient to 
treat a company as a taxable entity separate from its shareholder.  However, as explained 
in Part 1.4, substantive business activity is not an indicator of beneficial ownership, and 
the presence of business activity does not necessarily mean that an intermediary is not 
acting as a mere conduit.  Thus, this test may be appropriate for deciding straw company 
cases, but it is inappropriate for deciding conduit company cases. 
3.4  Base Companies 
Base companies are predominantly situated in a low tax or no-tax country, typically a 
tax haven.  The main function of a base company is to shelter income that would 
otherwise directly accrue to taxpayers, for the purpose of reducing the tax that they have 
to pay in their home countries.44 A supplementary function of a base company is to 
facilitate the improper use of tax treaties in a contracting state.  A taxpayer who 
establishes a base company for this purpose may be a resident of the other contracting 
state,45 or may be a resident of a third state.  The key consideration for the taxpayer in 
setting up this scheme is the treaty network of the tax haven where the base company is 
located. 
Most tax havens have either a very limited treaty network or none at all, though there 
are some treaties between havens and major industrial countries that allow domestic 
withholding tax to be reduced or eliminated, allowing the taxpayer to make a substantial 
saving.46 Taxpayers avoid taxation of this income through the technique of ‘secondary 
sheltering’.47 Secondary sheltering involves changing the nature of income in order to 
benefit  from  exemptions  contained  in  tax  treaties  or  domestic  rules  in  the  taxpayer’s  
country of residence.  In order to change the nature of income, a taxpayer can use tactics 
such as re-ploughing income by loans to a shareholder or alienating a holding in a base 
company to realise capital gains that may be exempted or taxed at a lower rate.48 
A base company is able to shelter income from taxation in the resident state because it 
exists as a legal entity separate from the taxpayer.  Income that it collects does not fall 
under the normal worldwide taxation regime of the resident state.  Thus, the taxpayer is 
                                                 
44 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies, 
in INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES (ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION, NO 1), supra note 14, at 60, para. 1 [hereinafter Base Companies Report]. 
45 See Decision of the Bundesfinanzhof of 5 March 1986, IR 2001/82, published in the Official Tax Gazette, 
Part II, 1986 at 496.  See also Rijkele Betten, Abuse of Law: Treaty Shopping through the Use of Base 
Companies, E.T. 323 (1986). 
46 E.g., in the case of N.  Indiana  Pub.    Serv.  Co.  v  Comm’r 105 T.C. 341 (1995) see infra Part 4.1, the U.S.-
Neth. double tax treaty extended to the Netherlands Antilles, which was then used as a tax haven. 
47 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, Tax Havens: Measures to Prevent Abuse by Taxpayers, in 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION: FOUR RELATED STUDIES (ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION NO 1), supra note 14, at 20, para.  27. 
48 Id. 
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not liable to pay tax on income received by the base company.49 Courts commonly use 
a substantive business activity test to decide whether to recognise a base company or to 
look through it to the ultimate owner of the income. 
3.5  Why is Substantive Business Activity a Test for Base Company Cases? 
Countries and courts have taken a number of measures to prevent tax avoidance that 
employs base companies.  Some countries have enacted controlled foreign company 
legislation.  Additionally, courts apply general anti-avoidance rules or judicial anti-
avoidance doctrines like the abuse of law doctrine in civil law jurisdictions and the 
substance over form approach in common law jurisdictions.50 In the United States in 
particular, the courts have applied judicial doctrines such as the business purpose test 
and the sham transaction doctrine to decide base company cases.51 
As mentioned in Part 3.4, a base company is able to shelter income from tax in the 
resident state because the base company is an entity in its own right and is recognised 
as such in the resident country.52 For this reason, taxpayers in base company cases are 
often taxed on a ‘piercing of the corporate veil’ approach.53 Cases involving the 
application of this approach turn on whether a base company can be disregarded for tax 
purposes with the result that its activity, or income derived from its activity, may be 
attributed to the taxpayer.54  Taxpayers often claim that the income cannot be attributed 
to them because it is derived from a substantive business activity.  That is, courts apply 
the substantive business activity test to ascertain the nature of the activities of a base 
company.55 If a court finds that a base company does nothing more than receive passive 
income that would have directly accrued to the taxpayer, then it may attribute income 
of a base company to the taxpayer.56 
3.6  Difference between Base Company Cases and Conduit Company Cases 
Base company cases involving parties from more than two jurisdictions may appear to 
be similar to conduit company cases in two respects.  First, the structures of the 
corporate groups or chains that are involved are similar.  Secondly, in both cases income 
accrues in an economic sense to the taxpayer in the resident country, so courts in both 
base company and conduit company cases effectively decide the question of whether 
income of an intermediary can be attributed to the taxpayer.  Courts may apply the 
substantive business activity test to conduit company cases because of these 
similarities.57  
Notwithstanding the apparent similarities between the two kinds of cases, it is 
inappropriate to treat base company and conduit company cases in the same manner 
because there are crucial differences. 
                                                 
49 Base Companies Report, supra note 44, at para. 10. 
50 See Prebble & Prebble, supra note 29. 
51 Id, at 164-166.  See also DANIEL SANDLER, TAX TREATIES AND CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANY 
LEGISLATION: PUSHING THE BOUNDARIES 8 (1998). 
52 Base Companies Report, supra note 44, at para 10. 
53 See also id.  at para.  24. 
54 See, e.g., Hosp.  Corp.  of  Am.  v.  Comm’r, 81 T.C. 520 (1983), considered in Part 4.6 of this article. 
55 Id. 
56 Id., though in Hosp.  Corp.  of  Am.  v.  Comm’r the court found sufficient business activity to determine 
that the company in question was not merely an inactive base company. 
57 See, e.g., N, Indiana, 105 T.C. 341, discussed in Part 4.1 of this article. 
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A base company seeks to minimise tax in a taxpayer’s  country  of  residence.  The base 
company, located in another jurisdiction, shelters income from taxation that would 
otherwise apply in  the  taxpayer’s  residence  and  in  the  process  circumvents  domestic  
tax law.  For this reason, courts of the resident state decide a base company case in 
accordance with their domestic tax law.  In contrast, a conduit company secures tax 
benefits in the country of source of passive income.  A conduit company structure 
minimises tax by the improper use of double tax treaties that  limit  the  source  state’s  
right to impose withholding tax.  Because the conduit company secures benefits through 
a treaty, the courts of the source state decide conduit company cases in accordance with 
treaty law.  To repeat the point in a slightly different way, base company structures 
shelter income from tax imposed on the basis of residence while conduit company 
structures reduce or eliminate tax imposed on the basis of source. 
3.7  Purpose of Law as to Base Companies and Conduit Companies 
Although courts may adopt a substance over form approach when deciding both kinds 
of cases, treaty law functions differently from domestic tax law.  Treaty law applies the 
beneficial ownership test in order to ensure that an intermediary that is a resident of a 
contracting state by virtue of its incorporation enjoys passive income and does not pass 
the income on to residents of a third state.  That is, the beneficial ownership test operates 
with the object and purpose of limiting treaty benefits to residents of contracting states.  
The application of the substantive business activity test to base company cases has a 
different purpose.  That purpose is to determine whether (i) income that is derived by 
and retained by a base company should nevertheless be taxed to taxpayers who are 
resident in the state of residence on the basis that the income belongs in substance to 
those residents, or (ii) that it is not appropriate to tax the income to the residents to 
whom it belongs in substance because the base company has a good reason for deriving 
the income in its jurisdiction, namely that the income is derived in the course of a 
substantive business activity that is carried on in that jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, although an intermediary that carries out a substantive business 
activity may be able to satisfy the requirements of the domestic tax law applicable to a 
base company case, such an intermediary may still act as a conduit, forwarding passive 
income to a resident of a third state. 
Considerations of policy lead to the same conclusion.  Take taxpayer A, a resident of 
country X, who owns a company, ‘Baseco’, that is resident in country Y.  The policy 
question for country X is, should X tax the income of Baseco to its resident, A? 
In essence, just because a base company case has been decided in favour of an 
intermediary  on  the  basis  of  the  company’s  business  activity,  it  does  not  follow  that  a  
case that involves a conduit company that carries on a substantive business activity 
should also be decided in favour of the intermediary.  That is, it is illogical to draw an 
analogy between base company cases and conduit company cases. 
Nevertheless, courts have sometimes taken this quantum leap in conduit company cases.  
The case of Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue is a good example.58 
  
                                                 
58 N. Indiana, 105 T.C. 341; N. Indiana Pub.  Serv.  Co.  v.  Comm’r, 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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4. CONDUIT COMPANIES, BASE COMPANIES, AND STRAW COMPANIES BEFORE THE COURTS 
4.1  Northern Indiana Public Service Company v Commissioner of Internal Revenue: Facts  
The Northern Indiana case involved Northern Indiana, a United States company that 
wished to raise funds on the Eurobond market.  If Northern Indiana had borrowed funds 
directly from the Eurobond market it would have had to withhold United States 
withholding tax at the statutory rate on interest payments to the Eurobond holders, 
making Northern  Indiana’s  offer  less  attractive  in  that market. 
Article viii(1) of the United States-Netherlands double tax treaty of 29 April 1948,59 
which extended to the Netherlands Antilles, provided for a full withholding tax 
reduction on United States-sourced interest paid to companies in the Netherlands 
Antilles.  Furthermore, the Netherlands Antilles charged no tax on such interest, 
irrespective of whether it flowed in to residents or out to non-residents. 
In order to avoid paying United States withholding tax, Northern Indiana established a 
wholly owned Antillean subsidiary, which will be referred to as ‘Finance’.  The purpose 
of the structure was for Finance to borrow money from lenders in Europe, and to issue 
Eurobonds in return, rather than for Northern Indiana to do so.  Instead, Finance on-lent 
the money borrowed from the bondholders to Northern Indiana.  Finance lent money to 
Northern Indiana at an interest rate that was one per cent higher than that at which 
Finance borrowed from Eurobond holders.  There were two consequences.  First, 
Finance claimed the benefit of the US-Netherlands treaty described in the previous 
paragraph.  Secondly, Finance earned a profit in the Antilles that it invested to produce 
more income.  Eventually Northern Indiana repaid the principal amount with interest to 
Eurobond holders through Finance, and then liquidated Finance. 
  
                                                 
59 Supplementary Convention Modifying and Supplementing the Convention with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and Certain Other Taxes, U.S.-Neth., Dec. 30, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 896.  [hereinafter U.S.-Neth. 
Supplementary Convention].  The relevant part of art. VIII(1) provides: ‘Interest  on  bonds,  notes,  …  paid  
to a resident or corporation of one of the Contracting States shall be exempt from tax by the other 
Contracting State.’ 
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Figure 2: The Northern Indiana case 
 
Northern Indiana did not deduct withholding tax from interest payments to Finance.  
The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to Northern Indiana, declaring it liable 
to pay the tax that it did not withhold. 
4.2  Arguments and Decision in the Northern Indiana Case 
It was not disputed that Northern Indiana structured its transactions with Finance in 
order to obtain the full withholding tax reduction under the United States-Netherlands 
double tax treaty.60 The Commissioner argued that Finance was a mere conduit in the 
borrowing and interest-paying process, so Finance should be ignored for tax purposes, 
and Northern Indiana should be viewed as having paid interest directly to the Eurobond 
holders. 
The United States Tax Court observed that: ‘Normally, a choice to transact business in 
corporate form will be recognised for tax purposes so long as there is a business purpose 
or the corporation engages in business activity.’61 Because Finance was involved in the 
business activity of borrowing and lending money at a profit, the court recognised it as 
                                                 
60 N. Indiana, 115 F.3d 506. 
61 N. Indiana, 105 T.C. at 347. 
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the recipient of interest payments from Northern Indiana.62 The court held that the 
interest payments were exempt from United States withholding tax.  The Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court.  Because the Tax Court 
based its decision on the business activity of Finance, the Tax Court effectively 
considered substantive business activity to be a sufficient criterion to determine whether 
Finance qualified for treaty benefits. 
4.3  Northern Indiana: an Illogical Analogy  
The Tax Court considered substantive business activity to be a sufficient criterion 
because it drew an analogy with straw company and base company cases that were 
decided on the basis of the substantive business activity test.  It seemed to have confused 
the facts of the Northern Indiana case for the following two reasons. 
First, according to the Tax Court, Finance was created for a business purpose, namely 
‘to borrow money in Europe and then lend money to [Northern Indiana] in order to 
comply with the requirements of prospective creditors’.63  This role is similar to that of 
a straw company.  However, the fact that Finance was created for a business purpose 
was irrelevant to what the court should have seen as the real issue, which was whether 
Finance was the beneficial owner of the interest payments.  Finance was not the 
beneficial owner of the interest payments; rather the Eurobond holders were the 
beneficial owners of the interest payments.  The reason is that Northern Indiana 
involved the application of a double tax treaty, not the application of United States 
domestic tax law.  The court, therefore, should have analysed the facts in the light of 
the object and purpose of the double tax treaty.  The treaty in question did not use the 
term ‘beneficial owner’.  Rather, it exempted interest from tax that was ‘paid to a 
resident corporation of one of the contracting states’.  As explained in Part 1.1 and 1.2 
of this article, this provision should be interpreted substantively.  Receipt by a mere 
conduit that contrives to be resident in a contracting state does not satisfy the policy of 
the treaty. 
Secondly, as with a taxpayer in a base company scheme, Northern Indiana (the 
taxpayer) established a foreign subsidiary to avoid tax in the United States, the country 
of its residence.  However, Northern Indiana was a source company; unlike the position 
in base company structures, Northern Indiana interposed Finance to obtain a reduction 
in United States withholding tax under the United States-Netherlands double tax treaty.  
Moreover, Eurobond holders, rather than Northern Indiana, benefited from the treaty-
based elimination of United States withholding tax on interest payments.  This result 
was obtained even though Finance was not related to Eurobond holders.  That is, the 
Northern Indiana case was a conduit company case, not a base company case. 
The last paragraph says that Eurobond holders benefited from treaty-based elimination 
of withholding tax.  This statement does not ignore that Northern Indiana was the 
ultimate beneficiary, in that by exploiting the treaty it was able to borrow at a rate of 
interest that was cheaper than the rate that it would have suffered had the Eurobond 
holders received their interest subject to United States withholding tax.  In that 
eventuality, the bondholders would have required the interest to have been grossed up 
to a rate that would have yielded a net return to the bondholders equivalent to the net 
return that they received via the scheme that Northern Indiana in fact adopted.  In this 
                                                 
62 Id, at 348. 
63 Id. at 354. 
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economic sense Northern Indiana benefited from the elimination of withholding tax on 
interest that it paid to Finance.  However, this is not the sense in which we must use 
‘benefit’ in connection with tax treaty benefits in respect of passive income.  The focus 
is on benefits that treaties bestow on recipients of passive income, not on concomitant 
economic benefits that payers of passive income may derive as a result.  In the Northern 
Indiana case the treaty conferred benefits on Finance, as a resident of the Netherlands 
Antilles, a benefit that Finance passed on to the bondholders. 
By drawing an analogy between conduit company cases and base and straw company 
cases, the court in Northern Indiana analysed the facts within the wrong frame of 
reference.  This point is further illustrated by comparing the Northern Indiana case with 
two other cases referred to by the court, namely Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue,64 a straw company case, and Hospital Corporation of America v 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,65 a base company case. 
4.4  Moline Properties Inc v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
In Moline Properties, Mr Thompson mortgaged his property to borrow money for an 
investment that proved unprofitable.  Thompson’s  creditors  advised  him to incorporate 
Moline Properties Inc (Moline) to act as a security device for the property.  He conveyed 
the property to Moline in return for all of its shares.  Moline also assumed the 
outstanding mortgage.  Thompson then transferred the shares as collateral to a trust 
controlled by his creditors. 
Until Thompson repaid the original loans, Moline carried out a number of activities, 
including assuming Thompson’s   obligations   to   his original creditors, defending 
proceedings brought against Moline, and instituting a suit to remove prior restrictions 
on the property.  After Thompson discharged the mortgage and gained control over 
Moline, Moline entered into several transactions involving the property.  These 
transactions included mortgaging, leasing, and finally selling the property.  Moline kept 
no books and maintained no bank account.  Thompson received the proceeds from the 
sale, which he deposited into his bank account.  Although initially Moline reported the 
gain on sales of the property in its income tax returns, Thompson filed a claim for a 
refund  on  Moline’s  behalf  and  reported  the  gain  in his own tax return. 
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the gain from the sale 
of the property was attributable to Moline.  In order to answer that question, the court 
considered whether Moline should be disregarded for tax purposes, which turned on 
whether Moline carried on a business activity.  The court observed:66 
The doctrine of corporate entity fills a useful purpose in business life.  
Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the law of the state of 
incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or to 
serve the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that 
purpose is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on 
of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable 
entity. 
                                                 
64 Moline  Properties  Inc.  v.  Comm’r, 319 U.S. 436 (1943). 
65 Hosp.  Corp.  of  Am.  v.  Comm’r, 81 T.C. 520 (1983). 
66 Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438. 
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According  to  the  court,  Moline’s  activities  were  sufficient  to  recognise  it  as  a  taxable  
entity separate from Thompson, and the court attributed the gain on sales to Moline. 
4.5  Difference between Northern Indiana and Moline Properties 
It is difficult to understand how the court logically relied on Moline Properties when 
applying the substantive business activity test in Northern Indiana.  The court in Moline 
Properties was aware that Mr Thompson was the beneficial owner of the property and 
of the income from its sale.  The issue was whether Moline received income as a taxable 
entity separate from Thompson.  In that context, the presence of business activity was 
sufficient to determine that Moline existed as a separate taxable entity.  In contrast, in 
Northern Indiana, it was clear that Finance received payments.  The issue should have 
been whether Finance was the beneficial owner of interest payments and was therefore 
entitled to treaty benefits, or was acting as a mere conduit.  Nevertheless, the conclusion 
of the Tax Court in Northern Indiana shows that it focused on the issue of whether 
Finance was the recipient of the interest payments not on whether it was the beneficial 
owner of those payments.67  At the risk of labouring the point, the issue in Moline 
Properties was receipt.  Receipt was not in issue in Northern Indiana, which concerned 
ownership, a different matter.  
The court in Northern Indiana considered Article viii(1) the United States-Netherlands 
double tax treaty.  Although the provision did not use the term ‘beneficial owner’,68 the 
focal issue should have been whether Finance was the substantive economic owner of 
the interest payments, That is, Finance was the beneficial owner, to use the term in its 
ordinary sense.  The result was that, although the context of the double tax treaty 
required the court to interpret the provision from a substantive economic perspective, 
the court in fact interpreted it from a formal legalistic perspective.  
The Tax Court observed: ‘Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner …  stands  for  the  
general proposition that a choice to do business in corporate form will result in taxing 
business profits at the corporate level.’69  This observation shows that the court in 
Northern Indiana interpreted the treaty provision and considered the facts by applying 
the analytical framework that satisfied the domestic law requirements exemplified in 
Moline Properties.  As a result, the court mistakenly drew an analogy with domestic 
straw company cases and concluded that tax should be levied at the corporate level 
rather than at shareholder level.  In contrast, the relevant issue for treaty interpretation 
is not so much who receives the income but who owns it.  In other words, is the recipient 
the owner of the income in the relevant, substantive sense? 
4.6  Hospital Corporation of America v Commissioner of Internal Revenue70 
As mentioned in Part 4.3, the Tax Court in Northern Indiana also referred to Hospital 
Corporation of America, a base company case.  In this case, Hospital Corporation of 
America (Hospital Corporation), entered into a management contract with King Faisal 
                                                 
67 N. Indiana, 105 T.C. at 348. 
68 U.S.-Neth. Supplementary Convention, supra note 59.  The relevant part of art VIII(1) provides: ‘Interest 
on  bonds,  notes,  …  paid  to  a  resident  or  corporation  of  one  of  the  Contracting  States  shall be exempt from 
tax by the other Contracting State.’ 
69 N. Indiana, 105 T.C. at 351. 
70 Hosp. Corp, 81 T.C. 520. 
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Specialist Hospital in Saudi Arabia.  Hospital Corporation established the following 
corporate structure. 
Hospital Corporation incorporated Hospital Corp International Ltd, a wholly owned 
subsidiary in the Cayman Islands.  Hospital Corp International Ltd held all the shares 
in Hospital Corporation of the Middle East Ltd (Middle East Ltd), also incorporated in 
the Cayman Islands.  Middle East Ltd and Hospital Corporation had the same officers 
and directors.  Middle East Ltd did not have its own office.  Rather, it shared an office 
with the law firm that prepared its incorporation documents.  Hospital Corporation 
decided to administer the management contract through Middle East Ltd, which acted 
as a base company.  That is, Middle East Ltd had the role of trapping income in a tax 
haven, the Cayman Islands. 
Figure 3: The Hospital Corporation of America case 
 
There were two issues before the court: first, whether Middle East Ltd was a sham 
corporation that should not be recognised for tax purposes; secondly, whether its 
Hospital Corporation
Middle East Ltd
King Faisal Specialist
Hospital
USA
The Cayman Islands
Saudi Arabia
100%
Management
contract
Income
Ownership
Management
contract
Flow of income
Hospital Corp
International Ltd
100%
eJournal of Tax Research   Conduit companies 
 
407 
 
income was attributable to Hospital Corporation under section 482 of the Internal 
Revenue Code.71  
The United States Tax Court found that Middle East Ltd ‘carried out some minimal 
amount of business activity’.72 The court observed:73 
[Middle East Ltd] possessed the ‘salient features of corporate organization.’  
….  [Middle  East  Ltd]  was  properly  organized  under  the  Companies  Law  of  
the Cayman Islands.  In 1973, [Middle East Ltd] issued stock, elected directors 
and officers, had regular and special meetings of directors, had meetings of 
shareholders, maintained bank accounts and invested funds, had at least one 
non-officer employee, paid some expenses, and, with substantial assistance 
from [Hospital Corporation], prepared in 1973 to perform and in subsequent 
years did perform the [King Faisal Specialist Hospital] management contract.  
All of these are indicative of business activity. 
The court explained that the quantum of business activity needed for a company to be 
recognised as a separate taxable entity ‘may be rather minimal’.74 Because Middle East 
Ltd carried out the above business activities, the court held that Middle East Ltd was 
not a sham corporation, and was a separate taxable entity for the purpose of federal 
income tax.  However, the court held that 75 per cent of the net income of Middle East 
Ltd was allocable to Hospital Corporation because Hospital Corporation performed 
substantial services for Middle East Ltd without being paid. 
4.7  Difference between Northern Indiana and Hospital Corporation of America 
It did not make sense for the court in Northern Indiana to rely on the reasoning of the 
court in Hospital Corporation of America.  In Hospital Corporation of America, the 
court used the substantive business activity criterion to determine whether Middle East 
Ltd existed as a sham, or whether the company should be recognised as a separate entity 
for tax purposes.  The activities that the court considered to be business activities 
seemed nothing more than those that necessarily preserve the existence of a company.  
The court was primarily concerned with the issue of the existence of Middle East Ltd 
as a separate taxable entity.  For this reason, a minimal amount of activity was sufficient 
to satisfy the test that the court in Hospital Corporation had to apply.  By contrast, in 
Northern Indiana, the issue should have been whether Finance received income 
substantively, that is, whether Finance owned the income in a substantive sense, or 
whether it functioned as a mere conduit.  
Unlike Northern Indiana, Hospital Corporation of America did not concern a double 
tax treaty.  It follows that the case was not decided in the context of the object and 
purpose of a treaty.  The court in Hospital Corporation of America applied the sham 
transaction doctrine in the context of the United States domestic tax law, and found that 
the presence of business activity indicated sufficiently that Middle East Ltd was not a 
sham.  On the other hand, Northern Indiana concerned the United States-Netherlands 
double tax treaty, and should have been decided in the context of the object and purpose 
                                                 
71 Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the Secretary of the Treasury may allocate gross 
income, deductions and credits between or among two or more taxpayers owned or controlled by the same 
interests in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly reflect income of a controlled taxpayer. 
72 Hosp. Corp, 81 T.C. at 584. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 579. 
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of that treaty.  The fact that Finance carried out a business activity did not necessarily 
show that the arrangement was within the object and purpose of the treaty.  Regardless 
of whether Finance was engaged in a substantive business activity, it was undisputed 
that Northern Indiana located Finance in the Netherlands Antilles in order to obtain 
treaty benefits.  The application of the sham transaction doctrine cannot be equated with 
the application of the beneficial ownership test, even if the sham transaction doctrine 
deploys a substance over form approach.  Nevertheless, in Northern Indiana, the Court 
of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit used the words ‘conduit’ and ‘sham’ interchangeably 
with reference to Hospital Corporation of America,75 not, it seems, appreciating that, in 
Hospital Corporation, Middle East Ltd was not a conduit company at all.  Indeed, 
Middle  East  Ltd’s purpose was the opposite, to act as a base company to trap income, 
not as a conduit through which income would flow.  In short, the reasoning of the courts 
in Northern Indiana was mistaken. 
A related point that emerges from this analysis is that the substantive business activity 
test logically works as a one-way test in conduit company cases.  That is, the absence 
of business activity may establish that the interposition of an intermediary lacks 
substance; however, the fact that an interposed company has business activity does not 
necessarily show that the interposed company is not a conduit.  This argument is further 
illustrated by the reasoning of the Bundesfinanzhof in decisions concerning section 
50(3) of the German Income Tax Act,76 as it stood before 19 December 2006.  
Section 50d(3) deals with conduit company situations; however, as with the courts in 
Northern Indiana, the German legislature transposed the substantive business activity 
test from base company cases to conduit company cases.  For this reason, the application 
of section 50d(3) resulted in inconsistent decisions in similar sets of facts before the 
provision was amended in December 2006.  
5. THE SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS ACTIVITY TEST IN GERMAN LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 
5.1  Section 50d(3) of the German Income Tax Act 
Section 50d of the German Income Tax Act (abbreviated as ‘ESTG’) deals with cases 
where there has been a reduction in capital gains and withholding tax under German 
double tax agreements.  Section 50d(3) of the ESTG is a countermeasure enacted to 
frustrate the abuse of treaties and abuse of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive of the 
Council of the European Communities.77 The German legislature introduced section 
50d(3) of the ESTG in 1994.  Section 50d(3), before its amendment in December 
2006,78 read:79 
A foreign company is not entitled to full or partial relief under sections 1 and 2 
if and to the extent that persons with a holding in it would not be entitled to 
reimbursement or exemption had they received income directly, and if there is 
                                                 
75 N. Indiana, 115 F.3d 506. 
76 Einkommensteuergesetz [ESTG] [Income Tax Act], Oct.16, 1934, RGBl. I at 1005, § 50d(3) (Ger.). 
77 Council Directive 90/435/EEC, on the Common System of Taxation Applicable in the Case of Parent 
Companies and Subsidiaries of Different Member States, 1990 O.J. (L 225). 
78 Einkommensteuergesetz [ESTG] [Income Tax Act], Oct. 16, 1934, BGBl I at 3366, as amended by 
Jahressteuergesetzes [Finance Law], Dec. 13, 2006, BGBl I at 2878, § 50d(3). 
79 Einkommensteuergesetz [ESTG] [Income Tax Act], Oct.16, 1934, RGBl. I at 1005, § 50d(3). 
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no economic or other relevant reason for interposing the foreign company and 
the foreign company does not have a business activity of its own. 
Because the provision is not expressly restricted to dividends and withholding tax, it 
may be inferred that the provision also deals with conduit company situations in 
general.80  
Section 50d(3) of the ESTG is a special anti-avoidance rule.  It acts as a supplement to 
section 42 of the German General Tax Code81 (abbreviated as ‘AO’), which is the 
German general anti-avoidance rule.  In wording section 50d(3), the legislature relied 
heavily on the principle developed in the context of section 42 of the AO by case law 
on the use of foreign base companies by German residents.82 That is, as with the United 
States courts, the German legislature borrowed the substantive economic activity test 
from base company cases.  As a result, the Bundesfinanzhof has drawn analogies with 
base company cases when interpreting and applying section 50d(3).  A good example 
is the decision of the Bundesfinanzhof of 20 March 2002, which will be referred to as 
G-group 2002.83 
Section 50d(3), as it stood before December 2006, was worded in the negative.  That is, 
it set out conditions where a conduit company would not be entitled to a reduction of 
German withholding tax.  In the decision of 31 May 2005, which will be referred to as 
G-group 2005,84 the Bundesfinanzhof held that in order to deny tax relief the facts of a 
case should show that both economic or other valid reasons for the interposition of a 
corporation, and economic activity of the corporation itself, were absent at the same 
time.  That is, when deciding whether to refuse treaty benefits, the court considered the 
conditions for refusal to be cumulative.  To frame the test positively, in the view of the 
courts taxpayers qualify for benefits, and are not disqualified by section 50d(3), if they 
show that either there are economic or other valid reasons for the interposition of a 
company or that there is economic activity on the part of the company itself. 
With deference appropriate to people who do not speak German, the authors venture 
that section 50d(3) appears to require the opposite, that is that taxpayers desiring to take 
advantage of relevant treaty benefits must satisfy both conditions.  Be that as it may, in 
the context of conduit company cases even the existence of both conditions should not 
necessarily qualify companies for tax relief.  Nevertheless, in the G-group cases, to be 
considered here, the Bundesfinanzhof treated the conditions as alternatives, either of 
which would allow tax relief under section 50d(3).85 In effect, it regarded economic 
                                                 
80 See Rolf Füger & Norbert Rieger, German Anti-Avoidance Rules and Tax Planning of Non-Resident 
Taxpayers, 54 BULL. INT’L BUREAU FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 434, 441 (2000).  See also Wilhelm 
Haarmann & Christoph Knödler, German Supreme Tax Court Limits the Scope of the German Anti-Treaty 
Shopping Rule and Redefines Substance Requirement for Foreign Companies, 34 INTERTAX 260, 260 
(2006). 
81 Abgabenordnung [AO] [The General Tax Code], Mar. 16, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, TEIL I [BGBL.] 
at 3366, as amended, § 42.  According to § 42, the legal effects of provisions of the tax code may not be 
avoided by abusive behaviour on the part of the taxpayer.  In the event of such behaviour, tax will be 
imposed as if the taxpayer had structured the situation using the appropriate form. 
82 See Füger & Rieger, supra note 80, at 440. 
83 Re a Corporation, 5 I.T.L.R. 589 (2002) (BFH) (Ger.). 
84 Bundesfinanzhof [BFH] [Federal Tax Court] May 31, 2005, BUNDESSTEUERBLATT Teil II [BStBl. II] 14 
(para. 27) (Ger.). 
85 Id. at para. 31(bb) (emphasis added). 
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activity as sufficient to qualify for double tax relief.  In reaching this conclusion the 
Bundesfinanzhof relied on reasoning in base company cases. 
The cases of G-group 2002 and G-group 2005 concerned the same group of companies.  
The two cases had similar facts and gave rise to the same considerations of policy.  The 
same issues arose in each case.  They both involved conduit companies, but they came 
to opposite conclusions.  The reason was that in both cases the Bundesfinanzhof applied 
reasoning appropriate to base company cases. 
On the facts, base company reasoning made the cases appear to be distinguishable.  In 
the first case the conduit company was virtually a shell.  In the second case the conduit 
appeared to carry on business activity that might be described as ‘substantive’.  The 
court distinguished the cases on the basis of this factor, which, on policy grounds, 
should have been irrelevant to the question of whether the taxpayer that derived the 
income in question and that claimed the relevant treaty benefits was in substance the 
beneficial owner of that income.  Analysis of the facts of the cases illustrates these 
points. 
 5.2  The G-group 2002 Case: Facts and Decision 
The G-group 2002 case86 concerned the G-group of companies, which were involved 
in the television sector.  The corporate structure of the G-group started with Mr E, a 
resident of Bermuda, who held 85 per cent of the shares in G Ltd, a Bermudian 
corporation.  Mr B, a resident of the United States, and Mr H, a resident of Australia, 
each held 7.5 per cent of the shares.  G Ltd in turn owned Dutch BV, a company 
incorporated in the Netherlands.  Dutch BV was the taxpayer.  It used the business 
premises and other office equipment of another Dutch member of the G-group.  Dutch 
BV held all the shares in GmbH, a German corporation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 Re a Corporation, 5 I.T.L.R. 589. 
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Figure 4: G-group 2002 
 
GmbH paid dividends to Dutch BV, and deducted withholding tax from the payment.  
Dutch BV claimed a refund of German withholding tax under the German-Netherlands 
double tax treaty of 16 June 1959.87 The German tax authority granted a partial 
reimbursement.  This reimbursement corresponded to the participation of Mr H and Mr 
B in G Ltd in accordance with the respective German double tax treaties with Australia 
and the United States.  The tax authority, however, denied any further reimbursement 
on the basis that Mr E, who was the majority shareholder, was a resident of Bermuda, 
which does not have a double tax treaty with Germany.  The matter was heard before 
the Bundesfinanzhof.  
The Bundesfinanzhof held that, because Dutch BV was ‘a base company without real 
economic function’,88 the withholding tax relief could be refused under section 50d(3) 
of the ESTG,89 as well as under section 42 of the AO.  That is, although G-group 2002 
involved a conduit company scheme, the court referred to Dutch BV as a base company. 
                                                 
87 Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Fortune and 
Various Other Taxes, and for the Regulation of Other Questions Relating to Taxation, Ger.-Neth., June 16, 
1959,  593 U.N.T.S 3 [hereinafter Ger.-Neth. Double Taxation Agreement]. 
88 Re a Corporation, 5 I.T.L.R. at 599 (emphasis added). 
89 § 50d(3) of the ESTG was § 50d(1a) of the ESTG at the time of the decision. 
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5.3  G-group 2002: Another Analogy with Base Company Cases 
The Bundesfinanzhof was of the opinion that section 50d(3) had similar requirements 
and, therefore, a similar aim, to the aim of section 42 of the AO.90 Although the language 
of section 50d(3) clearly showed that the provision applied to conduit company cases, 
the court still drew an analogy with base company cases when interpreting the 
provision.  It observed:91 
According  to  the  jurisprudence  of  the  [Bundesfinanzhof]  …  ,  intermediary  base  
companies in the legal form of a corporation in a low tax regime country fulfil 
the elements of abuse if economic or otherwise acceptable reasons are missing.  
If  income  received  in  Germany  is  ‘passed  through’  a  foreign  corporation,  this  
is also true if the state of residence of the foreign corporation is not a low tax 
regime  …  .  The court accepts as a principle that tax law respects the civil law 
construction.  But there must be an exception for such constructions [where 
they possess] only the aim of manipulation. 
Although it was clear from the facts of the case that it involved the taxation of outward 
flowing income that had originated in Germany, the courts framed its reasons in terms 
of language appropriate to a case of income that flows inwards to Germany.  The court 
used phrases such as ‘intermediary  …   in   the   legal   form   of   corporation’, ‘tax law 
respects the civil law construction’, and ‘exception for such constructions’.  These 
words suggest that the court was preoccupied with the issue of when the separate entity 
of an intermediary could be ignored for tax purposes.  As discussed in part 5.1, the 
German   legislature’s   reliance   on   base company cases when drafting section 50d(3) 
seems to be the reason  for  the  court’s  approach. 
5.4  Is Business Activity a Conclusive Criterion for Deciding Conduit Company Cases? 
In G-group 2002, the Bundesfinanzhof noted that Dutch BV had no employees, 
premises or office equipment.  The court also considered the fact that the director of 
Dutch BV was serving as the director of other affiliated companies.  It did not accept 
the contention of Dutch BV that its interposition was for reasons of organisation and 
co-ordination, establishment of customer-relationships, costs, local preferences, and the 
conception of the enterprise.  The court observed:92 
All these aspects make plain the background of the construction of the G-group, 
they make plain why and how European engagement of the group was 
concentrated within the Netherlands.  But they cannot explain convincingly and 
justify why the foundation of [Dutch BV] as a letterbox corporation without 
economic or otherwise acceptable grounds was necessary. 
The Bundesfinanzhof was not convinced that Dutch BV had developed its own 
economic activity.93 It held that Dutch BV’s participation in GmbH, without any 
managing function, did not fulfil the requirement of economic activity under the 
provision. 
                                                 
90 Re a Corporation, 5 I.T.L.R. at 599. 
91 Id. at 600 (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 601. 
93Id. 
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Although the Bundesfinanzhof came to the correct conclusion, its logic does not make 
sense.  The problem with the judgment is that the court analysed the facts in the light of 
reasoning in base company cases, rather than in the light of the context and purpose of 
the German-Netherlands double tax agreement.  
Because of the analogy with base company cases, the Bundesfinanzhof’s   reasoning 
implied that the presence of economic activity was sufficient under section 50d(3) to 
allow treaty benefits.  This reasoning is not explicit in G-group 2002 because the court 
found that the activities of Dutch BV did not constitute ‘economic activity’ under 
section 50d(3).  
This approach was evident, however, in G-group 2005, where the Bundesfinanzhof, 
dealing with very similar facts, found that the activities of the Dutch subsidiaries did 
constitute economic activity under section 50d(3).94 
5.5 The G-group 2005 Case 
G-group 2005 concerned the same group of companies that were involved in G-group 
2002.  The corporate structure in G-group 2005, however, was slightly different.  In G-
group 2005, G Ltd wholly owned NV, a subsidiary incorporated in the Netherlands 
Antilles.  In addition, G Ltd wholly owned other Dutch, European and non-European 
subsidiaries.  NV, in turn, wholly owned two Dutch subsidiaries.  
The main difference between G-group 2002 and G-group 2005 was that in G-group 
2005, each Dutch subsidiary also held shares in other European and non-European 
corporations in addition to shares in a German company.  As in G-group 2002, the 
Dutch subsidiaries in G-group 2005 had no employees, business premises or equipment.  
Each subsidiary used the facilities of another affiliated Dutch company.  The German 
companies paid dividends to the Dutch subsidiaries and deducted withholding tax.  
 
 
  
                                                 
94 BStBl. II 14 (para. 27) (Ger.). 
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Figure 5: G-group 2005 
 
As with G-group 2002, the German tax authority in G-group 2005 granted a 
reimbursement in proportion to the participation of Mr H and Mr B, who were residents 
of Australia and the United States respectively, but denied a reimbursement to Mr E, 
who was a Bermudian resident.  The Bundesfinanzhof, however, allowed the refund 
under section 50d(3) of the ESTG.  
The court found that the facts satisfied both of the requirements of section 50d(3).  That 
is, there were economic and other relevant reasons for the interposition of the Dutch 
subsidiaries, and that the subsidiaries were involved in economic activities of their own. 
5.6  Interpretation of Section 50d(3) in the Light of Base Company Cases 
In a similar manner to the judicial reasoning in G-group 2002, the Bundesfinanzhof 
based its argument in G-group 2005 on base company cases.  When interpreting section 
50d(3), the court observed:95 
[Section 50d(3) of the ESTG] excludes the right of a foreign corporation to be 
tax   exempted   or   to   pay   a   lower   tax   …   according   to a double taxation 
convention, if persons participating in that corporation would have no right to 
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a reduction of tax had they received the dividends directly, and—first—there is 
no economic or otherwise valid reasons for the interposition of the corporation 
and—second-—the corporation does not have an economic activity of its own.  
The latter two requirements are cumulative for the tax relief to fail. 
It is clear that the court was of the opinion that the facts of a case must satisfy both 
conditions at the same time for the court to refuse a reduction in withholding tax under 
section 50d(3). 
The Bundesfinanzhof noted that the Dutch subsidiaries were part of the G-group along 
with European and non-European affiliates engaged in active business.96 Within the G-
group, the Dutch subsidiary held the shares of some of these affiliates, including the 
German companies.  The court regarded the mere holding of shares as economic 
activity.97 
According to the Bundesfinanzhof, all affiliates confided the holding of shares within 
the group to independent corporations such as the Dutch subsidiaries.  It found that this 
strategic outsourcing of the role of holding company was a long-term activity.  It 
therefore concluded that in the present case the activity was not undertaken for the 
purpose of obtaining a withholding tax refund under the German-Netherlands double 
tax treaty.  It noted that the Netherlands was the centre of the business of the European 
corporations of the G-group.  Thus, the Dutch subsidiaries were not located in the 
Netherlands solely for the purpose of obtaining treaty benefits.  The court, therefore, 
was of the opinion that the Dutch subsidiaries were entitled to treaty benefits by virtue 
of being residents of the Netherlands.98 
On the basis of these findings the Bundesfinanzhof concluded:99 
…  [The  Dutch  subsidiaries]  fulfilled  their  business  purpose—holding of shares 
in foreign corporations—on their own account and autonomously.  That is, the 
interposition of the Dutch subsidiaries had economic or other valid reasons.  
The absence of such reasons, however, is essential to deny a tax relief under 
[section 50d(3) of the ESTG].  Since [section 50d(3) of the ESTG] expressly 
refers to the (alternative) requirement of economic and other valid reasons, it is 
a special rule for abuse of law as compared to [section 42 of the AO], and may 
also be applied conclusively without reference to [section 42 of the AO]. 
5.7  Critique of the Reasoning of the Bundesfinanzhof 
Two points emerge from this conclusion.  First, the Bundesfinanzhof considered the 
absence of economic or other valid reasons to be essential when refusing tax relief under 
section 50d(3).  However, when allowing treaty benefits under section 50d(3), the 
presence of economic or other valid reasons seem to be alternative requirements.  That 
is, the requirement of economic or other valid reasons for interposition of the company 
in question and the requirement of economic activity seem to be alternatives when 
allowing treaty benefits.  Thus, it could be inferred that if a company carried out an 
economic activity, the Bundesfinanzhof would allow the company to claim treaty 
                                                 
96 Id. at para. 30(aa). 
97 Id. at para. 32. 
98 Id, at para. 31(bb). 
99 Id. (emphasis added). 
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benefits.  Effectively, the court considered economic activity to be a criterion sufficient 
to qualify the company in question for relief. 
Secondly, the court equated the presence of ‘economic or other valid reasons’ with 
business purpose.  In this respect, the reasoning of the Bundesfinanzhof resembles the 
reasoning of the United States Tax Court in the Northern Indiana case,100 where the 
court drew an analogy with base company cases, and was of the opinion that a 
withholding tax reduction was available ‘so long as there is a business purpose or the 
corporation engages in business activity’.101  It follows that, as with the court in 
Northern Indiana, the Bundesfinanzhof decided the case using an incorrect frame of 
reference. 
Moreover, the holding of shares of affiliates seems to be a weak form of economic 
activity.  Even if the holding of shares is an economic activity, there were no strong 
economic or other relevant reasons for interposing the Dutch subsidiaries.  The 
considerations that the Bundesfinanzhof regarded as ‘economic and other relevant 
reasons’ for the interposition of Dutch holding companies seemed to be reasons for the 
organisation and co-ordination of the G-group.102  In sharp contrast, the court in G-
group 2002 had rejected such reasons on the basis that they merely clarified the 
corporate structure and business engagements within the group.103 
The analysis of G-group 2002 and G-group 2005 shows that when applying the 
substantive business activity test at least some courts draw analogies with base company 
cases.  As a result, they decide conduit company cases erroneously, treating business 
activity as a sufficient criterion to qualify for tax relief.  
It seems illogical to base a decision in a conduit company case on whether there is 
business activity.  The discussion so far has shown that, logically, the criterion of 
business activity has merit as a one-way test in conduit company cases.  For instance, 
judgments in G-group 2002 and the A Holding case104 show that the absence of business 
activity establishes that the interposition of a company lacks substance and, therefore, 
that the company can be categorised as a conduit.  However, judgments in G-group 
2005 and the Northern Indiana case105 fail to show convincingly that the presence of 
business activity necessarily indicates that the intermediary company does not act as a 
conduit. 
6. WHAT CONSTITUTES SUBSTANTIVE BUSINESS ACTIVITY? 
6.1  Introduction 
Importing the test of substantive business activity from base company cases to conduit 
company cases is only a first step.  Having taken that step, a court faces the dual 
questions of what amounts to ‘business’ activity and how much such activity must exist 
to earn the term ‘substantive’.  The sections that follow examine cases that address these 
questions.  Generally, courts conflate the two questions, asking simply, ‘was there 
substantive business activity’?  Sometimes, there is not much going on, but the court 
                                                 
100 N.  Indiana  Pub.  Serv.  Co.  v.  Comm’r, 105 T.C. 341 (1995) 
101 Id. at 347 (emphasis added). 
102 Id. 
103 Re a Corporation, 5 I.T.L.R. 589, 601 (2002) (BFH) (Ger.). 
104  A Holding ApS v. Fed. Tax Admin., 8 I.T.L.R. 536 (2005) (Federal Court, Switz.). 
105 N. Indiana, 105 T.C. 341;. N.  Indiana  Pub.  Serv.  Co.  v.  Comm’r, 115 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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will nevertheless find ‘substantive business activity’.  Sometimes, the mere holding of 
shares and the management of passive income seems to constitute substantive business 
activity: a result that begs the question before the court, which is whether a holding of 
shares that undoubtedly exists amounts to a substantive business activity.  On 
examination, such an activity (if holding shares can legitimately be called an ‘activity’ 
at all) often appears to have little purpose apart from obtaining treaty benefits. 
The examination of what amounts to ‘substantive business activity’ that follows goes 
to the question of whether a company that claims to be carrying on a substantive 
business activity by virtue of holding shares should be dismissed as a mere conduit in 
two senses.  First, assuming, contrary to the thesis of this article, that substantive 
business activity is an appropriate criterion, does such activity exist?  Secondly 
assuming that the appropriate test for according treaty benefits is substantive ownership 
by a resident, it may be that whether there is substantive business activity may 
contribute to that test.  Put another way, while the presence of substantive business 
activity should not, in the submission of this article, satisfy a court inquiring whether a 
company qualifies for treaty benefits as a resident, the absence of substantive business 
activity might be thought to disqualify the company. 
6.2  Does Profit Spread Indicate Business Activity? 
As discussed in Part 4.1, in the Northern Indiana case106 there was a spread of one per 
cent  between  Finance’s   inward  and outward interest rates, which yielded a profit to 
Finance.  Finance invested that profit to produce more income.  According to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, this transaction by Finance had 
economic substance.  Thus, the court recognised Finance’s  activity  of  borrowing and 
lending money as meaningful business activity.  
The United States courts have used what is commonly known as a two-pronged test to 
determine whether a transaction has economic substance.  First, a court must find that 
a taxpayer subjectively had a non-tax purpose for the transaction.  That is, a transaction 
should be related to a useful non-tax business purpose that is plausible in the light of 
the  taxpayer’s  conduct  and  economic  situation.107 Secondly, there must be an objective 
possibility of a pre-tax profit.  That is, the transaction must result in a meaningful and 
appreciable enhancement in the net economic position of a taxpayer (other than to 
reduce its tax).108 This test has not been applied in a uniform manner.109 
As discussed in Part 4.3, the United States Tax Court found that Finance was established 
for a business purpose.  It seems that the United States Court of Appeals was referring 
to the second prong when it considered the profit spread in the Northern Indiana case.  
It observed:110 
Here, a profit motive existed from the start.  Each time an interest transaction 
occurred, Finance made money and [Northern Indiana] lost money.  Moreover, 
                                                 
106 N. Indiana, 115 F.3d 506. 
107 E.g., James A. Shriver  v.  Comm’r, 899 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1990). 
108 Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). 
109 Courts have applied the two-pronged test disjunctively and subjectively.  Some courts have not used the 
two-pronged test.  These courts have viewed business purpose and economic substance as mere precise 
factors to determine the issue of whether the transaction had any practical economic effect rather than the 
creation of some tax losses.  See Transcapital Leasing Assocs 1990-II LP v. U.S., 97 A.F.T.R 2.d 2006-
1916 (2006). 
110 N. Indiana, 115 F.3d at 514 (emphasis added). 
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Finance  reinvested  the  annual  …  interest  income  it  netted  on  the  spread  in  order  
to generate additional interest income, and none of the profits from these 
reinvestments are related to [Northern Indiana]. 
6.3  Re-invoicing and Diverted Profits 
Finance’s   activity of earning a profit on the inward and outward interest flows 
corresponds to a conventional re-invoicing transaction, which is generally regarded as 
tax avoidance.  Re-invoicing involves back-to-back transactions that manipulate prices 
to inflate deductions.  Re-invoicing is usually used for buying and selling transactions, 
typically for exporting or importing.  It involves three parties: a corporation that owns 
a business, an intermediary that can be located either in a foreign low tax jurisdiction111 
or in the country of the business owner;112 and customers.  Although the intermediary 
is often an affiliate of the business owner, in some situations the business owner uses 
disguised ownership.  
Re-invoicing is considered to be a tax avoidance practice.  The reason is that it involves 
a deliberate manipulation of prices charged between related parties, often based in 
different jurisdictions, with a view to allocating part of the combined profits to the 
jurisdiction with the lowest effective tax rate.  The Northern Indiana case is a special 
case of price manipulation in which the interest spread was the price charged by 
Finance.  Thus, when the court recognised the activity of Finance as a business activity, 
it effectively recognised tax avoidance as a business activity.  Moreover, since it was 
undisputed that the transaction was structured in order to obtain a tax benefit,113 the 
court effectively justified one technique of tax avoidance, treaty abuse, with another, 
re-invoicing. 
Further, although Finance invested its profits in unrelated investments and thereby 
earned additional income, the position remained unchanged because Finance was 
wholly owned by Northern Indiana.  Finance was created for a limited purpose and was 
liquidated after that purpose was accomplished.  Within a predetermined time the profits 
reverted to Northern Indiana. 
Where a corporate structure diverts profit to a subsidiary for that profit to revert to the 
parent company, it is a misuse of language to say that the diverted profit is an indication 
of business activity.  Revenue Ruling 84-153114 illustrates the point.  That Ruling 
involved facts similar to those of Northern Indiana, including the interposition of a 
profit-making Antilles subsidiary. 
6.4  Revenue Ruling 84-153: Profit Spread is Not Relevant At All 
Revenue Ruling 84-153 involved a United States parent company that maintained two 
wholly owned subsidiaries: one in the Netherlands Antilles and the other in the United 
States.  The United States parent arranged for the Antilles subsidiary to raise funds by 
issuing Eurobonds.  The Antilles subsidiary then on-lent the proceeds to the United 
                                                 
111 E.g., HIE  Holdings  Inc.  v.  Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2009-130. 
112 E.g., Cecil  Bros  Pty.  Ltd.  v.  Fed.  Comm’r  of  Taxation (1964) 111 CLR 430 (Austl.); Liggett Group Inc. 
v.  Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1990-18. 
113 N. Indiana, 115 F.3d at 511. 
114 Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383. 
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States subsidiary at an interest rate that was one per cent higher than the rate payable to 
the Eurobond holders.  In the process, the Antilles subsidiary earned a profit. 
Figure 6: Revenue Ruling 84-153 
 
The Internal Revenue Service ruled that the interest payments from the United States 
subsidiary to the Antilles subsidiary were not exempted from United States withholding 
tax under Article viii(1) of the United States-Netherlands double tax treaty of 29 April 
1948.115  The Internal Revenue Service found that the use of the Antilles subsidiary in 
the transaction was motivated by tax considerations and lacked ‘sufficient business or 
economic purpose to overcome the conduit nature of the transaction, even though it 
could be demonstrated that the transaction might serve some business or economic 
purpose’.116  That is, although the Internal Revenue Service seemed to acknowledge the 
existence of the profit spread, it did not consider the spread to be relevant.  
                                                 
115 Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes U.S.-Neth., Apr. 29, 1948, 32 
U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter U.S.-Neth. Tax Convention].  The relevant part of Article VIII(1) read: ‘Interest 
(on  bonds,  securities,  notes,  debentures,  or  on  any  other  form  of  indebtedness)  …,  derived  from  sources  
within the United States by a resident or corporation of the Netherlands not engaged in trade or business in 
the United States through a  permanent  establishment,  shall  be  exempt  from  United  States  tax  …’.  
116 Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, 383. 
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The Internal Revenue Service based its ruling on the object and purpose of double tax 
treaties.  When interpreting Article viii(1) of the United States-Netherlands double tax 
treaty, the Internal Revenue Service observed:117  
The words ‘derived ... by’ refer not merely to [the Antilles subsidiary’s]  
temporarily obtaining physical possession of the interest paid by [the United 
States subsidiary], but to [the Antilles subsidiary] obtaining complete 
dominion and  control  over  such  interest  payments  …  [F]or  purposes  of  the  
interest exemption in Article viii(1) of the Convention, the interest payments 
by [the United States subsidiary] will be considered to be ‘derived ... by’ the 
foreign bondholders and not by [the Antilles subsidiary]. 
The Internal Revenue Service’s  emphasis  on  the  words  ‘derived  …  by’ shows that it 
focused on the issue of whether the Antilles subsidiary was the substantive economic 
owner of the interest payments.  It interpreted Article viii(1) from a substantive 
economic point of view, which was consistent with the context in which double tax 
agreements function.  This approach seems more appropriate than that adopted by the 
courts in Northern Indiana. 
As discussed in Part 4.3, the court decided Northern Indiana by adopting reasoning 
from straw company and base company cases.  It did not decide the case in accordance 
with the object and purpose of double tax treaties.  If it is assumed that the court in 
Northern Indiana did consider the object and purpose of double tax treaties,118 the court 
misinterpreted Article viii(1).119  
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that ‘Under the terms of the 
Treaty, interest on a note that is ‘derived from’ a United States corporation by a 
Netherlands corporation is exempt from United States taxation’.120  Although the 
interest payments in question were made between 1982 and 1985, the United States 
Court of Appeals surprisingly chose to refer to Article viii(1) as it stood before its 
amendment in 1965.121  The relevant part of Article VIII(1), before its amendment in 
1965, read: 
Interest  …  derived   from   sources  within   the  United  States   by   a   resident   or  
corporation of the Netherlands not engaged in trade or business in the United 
States through a permanent establishment, shall be exempt from United States 
tax  … 
The  court’s  interpretation  of  the  provision shows that it emphasized the words ‘derived 
from’, rather than the words ‘derived   …   by’ that the Internal Revenue Service 
emphasized in the Revenue Ruling 84-153.  The  court’s  observation  suggests  that,  rather  
than focusing on the issue of whether the substantive economic owner of the interest 
payments was resident in the Netherlands, the court was preoccupied with the fact that 
the taxpayer, Northern Indiana, was located in the United States.  This observation 
reaffirms that the court analysed the facts erroneously. 
                                                 
117 Id. at 383. 
118 N. Indiana, 115 F.3d at 510. 
119 U.S.-Neth. Tax Convention, supra note 115, art. VIII(1). 
120 N. Indiana, 115 F.3d. 
121 U.S.-Neth. Tax Convention, supra note 115, art. VIII(1). 
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6.5 Reasons for the Existence of Interposed Company 
On an analysis of the facts of the Northern Indiana case in the light of the object and 
purpose of double tax treaties, it is difficult to conclude that there were legitimate 
reasons for the existence of Finance, the company that was interposed between 
borrower and lender. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed:122 
The   Commissioner   has   suggested   that   [Northern   Indiana’s]   tax-avoidance 
motive in creating Finance might provide one possible basis for disregarding 
the interest transactions between [Northern Indiana] and Finance.  The parties 
agree that Taxpayer formed Finance to access the Eurobond market because, 
in the early 1980s, prevailing market conditions made the overall cost of 
borrowing abroad less than the cost of borrowing domestically.  It is also 
undisputed that [Northern Indiana] structured its transactions with Finance in 
order to obtain a tax benefit—specifically, to avoid the thirty-percent 
withholding tax.  What is in dispute is the legal significance of [Northern 
Indiana’s]  tax-avoidance motive. 
This passage rests on assumptions about tax avoidance that the court neither articulated 
nor, it seems, recognised.123  These assumptions do not withstand scrutiny.  The first 
such  assumption   is   that   avoiding   tax  may  be   justified   if   the   taxpayer’s  motive   is   to  
achieve an increased return on the business or investment in question, if necessary by 
avoiding tax.  But this motive surely drives any tax avoidance: why avoid tax if not to 
retain  more  of  one’s  pre-tax income?  If this justification were accepted it is hard to see 
any circumstances where the revenue could successfully challenge business or 
investment structures that are adopted for tax avoidance purposes. 
The reasoning in the previous paragraph is stated broadly, being framed in terms of tax 
avoidance in general.  The reasoning may be re-phrased to focus on the form of 
avoidance that is relevant for purposes of this article, namely avoidance by exploiting 
a tax treaty.  Revisiting the passage quoted from the Northern Indiana case in the light 
of this sharper focus suggests that the passage assumes that an arrangement that 
frustrates the purpose of a double tax treaty by contriving to confer treaty benefits on 
residents of a third state is justified, or at least may be justified, if the reason for the 
arrangement is to reduce tax that would otherwise be suffered.  To quote again the 
pertinent words, ‘[Northern Indiana] structured   its   transactions   …   to   avoid   …  
withholding tax’.  The  court  rejected  the  Commissioner’s  challenge  to  the  structure  that  
Northern Indiana adopted to achieve that result.  That is, the court seems to have 
accepted that a motive of avoiding withholding tax justifies tax avoidance.  That 
reasoning is circular.  It  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  avoiding  tax  is  justified  if  one’s  
motive is to suffer less tax.  In  short,  the  court’s  assumption  does  not  withstand  scrutiny. 
                                                 
122 N. Indiana, 115 F.3d at 510. 
123 The authors use ‘tax avoidance’ to label the middle category in the tri-partite framework of ‘mitigation’ 
(that is, reducing tax by legitimate means); ‘avoidance’, (meaning reducing tax by means that frustrate the 
intention of the law or, in civil law terms, by abuse of law); and ‘evasion’ (meaning reducing tax by 
concealment or other illegality).  Prebble & Prebble, supra note 29, at 151, adds detail to this explanation.  
The 18th Congress  of  L’Académie   International  de  Droit  Comparé,  Washington  DC,  2010,  adopted   the  
analytical framework of mitigation, avoidance, and evasion for its study of tax minimisation: A 
COMPARATIVE LOOK AT REGULATION OF CORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE 1 (Karen B. Brown ed., 2012). 
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The first assumption, just discussed, focuses on the objective purpose of the 
arrangement in question, in the Northern Indiana case that purpose being also the 
purpose of the taxpayer.  Consider now a second apparent assumption lying behind the 
passage from Northern Indiana.  This second assumption focuses on the subjective 
motive of the taxpayer.  The court seems to assume that an arrangement that avoids tax 
by contriving to obtain treaty benefits for residents of a third country may survive the 
Commissioner’s  challenge  if  the  taxpayer’s motives are unexceptionable.  That is, even 
if from an objective perspective the arrangement itself has the purpose of avoiding tax 
the   arrangement   may   be   invulnerable   to   attack   by   the   revenue   if   the   taxpayer’s  
subjective motives did not involve tax avoidance.  An example might be where, for 
instance, it had not occurred to the taxpayer that the arrangement in question might 
reduce tax.  In the opinion of the court, another example appears to be the case where 
the taxpayer wishes to take advantage of a source of funds available for borrowing that 
offers cheaper rates than domestic lenders, even though after tax that source would be 
more expensive because interest would be subject to withholding tax (absent the 
interposition of a treaty-shopping structure). 
Such an argument should be untenable.  Indeed, in general principle a court should 
disregard as self-serving  a  taxpayer’s  evidence  that  an  arrangement  that  avoids  tax  by  
frustrating the objective of a treaty was driven by subjective reasons that do not involve 
tax avoidance.  To   summarise   these   points,   even   if   one   assumes   that   taxpayers’  
subjective motives are pure (at any rate, that the motives involve considerations other 
than   tax   avoidance),   it   does   not   follow   that   taxpayers’   arrangements   should   escape  
challenge by the revenue.  Taxpayers’  motives  may  differ  from  the  objective  purpose  
of arrangements that they construct.  It follows that it would be odd if taxpayers could 
defend avoidance arrangements by pleading that they had no intention to avoid tax, even 
if their pleas are true.  
An analogy with Christian belief may help.  Take the sixth Beatitude: ‘Blessed are the 
pure in heart: for they shall see God’.124  To Paul, this and other Biblical passages mean 
that ‘[A] man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law’.125  In the Northern 
Indiana case the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit appears to take a Pauline 
approach:  if  taxpayers’  hearts  are  pure,  justification  is  vouchsafed  to  them  (at  any  rate  
they qualify for a reduction in tax).  But the kind  of  faith  that  in  Paul’s  view  may  be  
sufficient for justification hardly suffices in a fiscal context.  When it is a question of 
minimising tax, taxpayers should be judged objectively, by their works, that is by the 
nature of the structures that they contrive.126  As James wrote, ‘You see that a man is 
justified by works and not by faith alone’.127  
The Pauline approach of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggests that the 
court   focused  on  Northern   Indiana’s  motive   and  analysed   the  company’s  borrowing 
structure in the light of that motive.  The court emphasised that Northern Indiana wished 
to raise funds for its business and that the main reason for introducing Finance between 
lenders and borrower was to escape the higher rates of interest imposed in the United 
States.  The court considered the motive of Northern Indiana to be related to business 
and therefore approved by law.128  The court therefore concluded that the arrangement 
                                                 
124 Matthew 5:8. 
125 Romans 3:28. 
126 C.f., Newton  v.  Fed.  Comm’r  of  Taxation [1958] AC 450 (P.C.) 465-466 (appeal taken from Austl.). 
127 James 2:24. 
128 N.  Indiana    Pub.  Serv.  Co.  v.  Comm’r, 115 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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withstood  the  Commissioner’s  challenge  because  it  related  to  a  business purpose.  The 
court pointed out that the interposition of financing subsidiaries in the Netherlands 
Antilles was ‘not   …   an   uncommon   practice’,129  a practice acknowledged by the 
legislative history of the Federal Deficit Reduction Act 1984.  This argument is 
tantamount to saying that an avoidance structure withstands challenge if everyone 
climbs on board, or, contrary to James, a pure heart is enough, do not be concerned with 
what the taxpayer actually does.   
 If this was indeed the view of the judges, it is odd.  It is most unlikely that negotiators 
of double tax treaties or legislators in approving treaties would have in mind that 
residents of third states should obtain treaty benefits by the simple expedient of 
establishing a subsidiary in one of the states.  In particular, how could a court sensibly 
attribute such a policy to the Senate of the United States?  It is plausible to consider that 
United States legislators might take the view that the United States should not impose 
tax on foreigners who derive interest that flows to them from sources within the United 
States.  Indeed, Congress later came to that conclusion.130  But if legislators were of that 
opinion the obvious action was to repeal the tax, not to require foreign lenders who 
wished to take advantage of that policy to get their borrowers to establish financing 
subsidiaries in the Netherlands Antilles.  Such a hypothetical policy would be 
incoherent. 
Because the court in Northern Indiana analysed the facts from the wrong perspective, 
it focused on the fact that the taxpayer was a resident of the United States.  In doing so 
the court seems to have overlooked that Eurobond holders who were residents of states 
other than the states that were parties to the treaty obtained tax advantages that the states 
parties had intended to go only to their own residents. 
Even if it is assumed that Finance had a business activity, its activity seemed 
uncomplimentary to the business activity of Northern Indiana, a domestic utility 
company.  Moreover, as discussed in Part 4.1, Finance was liquidated soon after 
Northern Indiana completed the payment of the principal amount plus interest to the 
Eurobond holders.  These facts suggest that in the corporate structure Finance was 
merely a conduit for passing on interest to Eurobond holders. 
6.6  Can Holding Shares Constitute a Business Activity? 
As discussed previously,131 in G-group 2002132 the only business activity of Dutch BV 
was to hold shares of GmbH. Dutch BV had no personnel or business premises.  The 
business director of Dutch BV served as the business director of other affiliated 
companies in the Netherlands.  According to the Bundesfinanzhof, Dutch BV’s activity 
did not constitute ‘economic activity’ under section 50d(3) of the ESTG.  It observed:133 
                                                 
129 Id. at 513. 
130  ‘Section 127 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984 generally repealed the former 30 percent United States 
withholding tax on interest derived by non-resident  aliens  …  from  certain  debt  obligations  issued  after  July  
18, 1984, by United States corporations, the United States government, and certain foreign corporations 
engaged in a substantial amount of business activity in the United States.’  Roger E. Pront & Roger M. 
Zatieff, Repeal of the United States Withholding Tax on Interest Paid to Foreigners, 3 INT’L TAX & BUS.  
LAW.  191 (1986). More formally, the Tax Reform Act 1984 was the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.  
L. No 98–368, 1, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). 
131 See supra Part 5.4. 
132 Re a Corporation, 5 I.T.L.R. 589, 602 (2002) (BFH) (Ger.). 
133 Id. at 601(emphasis added). 
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Additionally, there is no proof that the plaintiff has developed its own 
economic activity.  To hold the participation [that is, the shares that the 
plaintiff company held] in the German G-GmbH without any managing 
function does not fulfil the requirements that can be expected for such an 
activity.  The fact that the Parent-Subsidiary directive of the European Union 
… in   art   2   uses   the   wording   ‘company   of   a   Member   State’   without   any  
requirements of an activity does not change the statement.  Even if it were 
conclusive that, according to the Directive, to hold one single participation in 
a corporation and, therefore, the existence of a pure holding corporation were 
sufficient  …,  a  simple  letterbox-company with only formal existence like the 
plaintiff, however, would not correspond to the supranational requirements. 
This observation implies that regardless of the number of companies in which an 
intermediary holds shares, this activity does not fulfil the requirement of ‘economic 
activity’ unless the intermediary carries out its own directorial functions.  The 
Bundesfinanzhof followed this approach in G-group 2005. 
As discussed in Part 5.5 in G-group 2005 the affiliates out-sourced the passive 
shareholding activity to the Dutch subsidiaries.  The Bundesfinanzhof considered 
holding of shares to be an economic activity.  It emphasized two facts.  First, the Dutch 
subsidiaries were holding shares of their own accord, and were functioning 
autonomously.  Secondly, the Dutch subsidiaries held shares in other foreign companies 
in addition to shares in the German companies.134  
Holding shares should not be regarded as an economic activity, even if the company 
manages its own operations.  This argument applies even if the intermediary holds 
shares in more than one company.  Holding shares is a weak form of business activity, 
and the fact that an intermediary that holds shares also has an active board of directors 
does not necessarily add any substance to the shareholding activity, at least not in the 
context of double tax treaties.  Such an intermediary can still act as a conduit.  
As explained in part 5.3 of this article, the reason why the Bundesfinanzhof in G-group 
2002 accorded importance to management functions seems to be that the court decided 
the case in the light of reasoning in base company cases.  As explained in part 5.3, 
because the court drew an analogy with base company cases it was preoccupied with 
the issue of the recognition of an intermediary for tax purposes.  As illustrated by 
Hospital Corporation of America,135 courts in base company cases tend to consider the 
presence of an active board of directors to indicate that a corporation carries out 
substantive business activity and therefore can be recognised for tax purposes.136  
Nevertheless, G-group 2002 and G-group 2005 were conduit company cases, and, 
therefore, should have been decided in the light of the purpose of the Germany-
Netherlands double tax treaty.137 In G-group 2005 ‘managing function’ acted as a 
misleading label that hid the conduit nature of the Dutch subsidiaries and allowed them 
to obtain treaty benefits improperly.  By recognising ‘management function’ as 
‘economic activity’ under section 50d(3), the Bundesfinanzhof effectively recognised 
the improper use of tax treaties as economic activity. 
                                                 
134 Bundesfinanzhof [BFH] [Federal Tax Court] May 31, 2005, BUNDESSTEUERBLATT Teil II [BStBl. II] 14 
(para. 32) (Ger.). 
135Hosp.  Corp  of  Am.  v.  Comm’r 81 T.C. 520 (1983). 
136 At 584. 
137Ger.-Neth. Double Taxation Agreement, supra note 87. 
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6.7  Reasons for the Existence of the Dutch Subsidiaries 
It is difficult to find a reason for the existence of the Dutch subsidiaries in the G-group 
apart from obtaining the benefit of a full withholding tax reduction under the German-
Netherlands double tax treaty.  The diagram in Part 5.5 shows that apart from treaty 
benefits there seems to have been no point in the existence of the sub-holding companies 
inserted in the structure between G Ltd in Bermuda and the operating companies in 
Europe.  
Double tax treaties between the Netherlands and the resident states of most of the 
affiliates provided for a full reduction of withholding tax on dividends.  Thus, the 
location of the Dutch subsidiaries ensured that dividends flowed from affiliates in 
general and German companies in particular ultimately to Bermuda with a minimum 
tax impost.  
As mentioned in Part 5.5, the Dutch subsidiaries within the G-group acted as conduits.  
The Dutch subsidiaries had no employees, business premises or equipment.  Their 
business director served several other affiliates.  They had no activity apart from holding 
the affiliates’  shares.   
As discussed in Part 5.6, the Bundesfinanzhof accorded importance to the activities of 
the other affiliated companies.138  It noted that the Dutch subsidiaries formed part of a 
group of companies involved in the television sector.  Within the group, they functioned 
as long-term shareholders in the other affiliated companies.  The court regarded these 
facts as ‘economic and other valid reasons’ for the interposition of the Dutch 
subsidiaries.139 
In contrast, when examining the activity of Dutch BV in G-group 2002, the 
Bundesfinanzhof observed:140  
Finally, it is without any relevance in this connection that [Dutch BV’s] sister-
companies, also resident in the Netherlands, might fulfil the requirement of an 
economic activity and play an active functional part of the G group.  Assuming 
that this is true, the only economic activity of the sister-corporations may not 
be attributed to [Dutch BV] in a way that [Dutch BV] could be treated as a 
managing holding corporation.  
This observation illustrates that economic activity that is irrelevant to the income in 
question cannot be considered relevant when determining whether an intermediary is 
entitled to treaty benefits in respect of that income.  In G-group 2005, the activity of the 
Dutch subsidiaries did not serve the economic interests of the affiliates.  It follows that 
their activity did not add to the significance of Dutch subsidiaries in the G-group. 
The German legislature amended section 50d(3) of the ESTG on 19 December 2006.  
In the amended section 50d(3) the German legislature specifically addressed the 
loopholes exploited by the taxpayer in G-group 2005.  The provision, however, still 
uses business activity as a criterion, and fails to explain   why   an   intermediary’s  
                                                 
138 BStBl. II 14 (para. 32) (Ger.). 
139 Id. at para. 31(bb). 
140 Re a Corporation, 5 I.T.L.R.  at 601. 
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economic activity should entitle the intermediary to be treated as a resident owner of 
the income. 
6.8  The Amended Section 50d(3) of the ESTG 
Section 50d(3), as it stands after its amendment on 19 December 2006, reads:141 
1A foreign company is not entitled to a full or partial relief under sections 1 
and 2 if and to the extent persons with a holding in it are not entitled to 
reimbursement or exemption, had they received income directly, and 
1. There is no economic or other relevant reason to establish the foreign 
company or 
2. The foreign company does not earn more than 10 per cent of its gross 
income from its own economic activity or 
3. The foreign company does not participate in general commerce with 
business premises suitably equipped for business purposes. 
2Only the circumstances of the foreign company shall be taken into account; 
organisational, economic and other significant features of companies that have 
close relations   to   the   foreign   company  …   shall   not   be   considered.  3The 
foreign company shall be regarded as having business operations of its own, 
as long as the foreign company earns its gross returns from the management 
of assets or a third party is in charge of their essential business operations.  
4Sentences 1 to 3 shall not be applied if the main class of the shares of the 
foreign company is traded substantially and regularly on a recognised stock 
exchange or the foreign company is subjected to the rules and regulations of 
the Investment Tax Act. 
By quantifying ‘economic activity’, and by clarifying its meaning, the provision may 
prevent companies without a business activity from obtaining the benefit of a 
withholding tax reduction under a double tax treaty.  However, the provision fails to 
capture situations in which an interposed foreign company should be treated as a mere 
conduit despite being involved in a genuine business activity.  This was the position in 
Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société Bank of Scotland.142 
Although Bank of Scotland was a French case and did not concern section 50d(3) of the 
ESTG at all, it is relevant in the present context because it illustrates that section 50d(3) 
would have failed to function effectively if it had been applied to that case. 
6.9 The Bank of Scotland Case 
Pharmaceuticals Inc was a company resident in the United States.  It held all the shares 
in Marion SA, a French company.  In 1992 Pharmaceuticals Inc entered into a three-
year usufruct contract with the Bank of Scotland, a company resident in the United 
Kingdom, under which the bank acquired dividend coupons attached to some shares of 
Marion SA.  The Bank of Scotland acquired the usufruct in consideration for a single 
payment to Pharmaceuticals Inc.  Under the contract, the bank was entitled to receive a 
                                                 
141 Einkommensteuergesetz [ESTG] [Income Tax Act], Oct., 16, 1934 BGBl I at 3366, as amended by 
Jahressteuergesetzes [Finance Law], Dec., 13, 2006 BGBl I at 2878, § 50d(3).  The numbering system 
adopted with superscript numbers 1 to 4 is the numbering system of the Einkommensteuergesetz.  These 
superscript numbers appear in the beginning of sentences, not paragraphs. 
142 Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société Bank of Scotland, 9 I.T.L.R. 683 (2006). 
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predetermined dividend from Marion SA in each of the three years of the usufruct.  
Pharmaceuticals Inc guaranteed the payment of dividends.  
By French law, dividends that Marion SA paid to foreign recipients were subject to a 
25 per cent withholding tax.  Article 9(6)143 of the France-United Kingdom double tax 
treaty of 22 May 1968 reduced French withholding tax to 15 per cent on dividends 
distributed to a company resident in the United Kingdom.  The France-United States 
double tax treaty of 28 July 1967 contained a similar provision.  But Article 9(7)144 of 
the France-United Kingdom treaty also provided for a refund of the avoir fiscal that 
France imposed after the deduction of withholding tax. 
Pharmaceuticals Inc designed its usufruct arrangement with the Bank of Scotland in 
order to obtain the benefit of the provisions of the France-United Kingdom double tax 
treaty.  The arrangement would have allowed Pharmaceuticals Inc to obtain both a 
withholding tax reduction of 10 per cent (from 25 per cent to 15 per cent) and a refund 
of the avoir fiscal.  Further, by the end of the three years of the usufruct, the Bank of 
Scotland would have received both its three years of dividends and a refund of the avoir 
fiscal.  The aggregate of dividends and avoir fiscal would have exceeded the price that 
the Bank of Scotland paid to Pharmaceuticals Inc for the assignment of the right to 
dividends from Marion SA at the inception of the scheme.  (No doubt the excess 
represented  the  bank’s  share  of  French  tax  that  Pharmaceuticals  Inc  had  hoped  to  save  
by means of the scheme.) 
If Pharmaceuticals Inc had received dividends directly from Marion SA it would have 
paid 15 per cent French withholding tax under the France-United States double tax 
treaty but would not have qualified for a refund of the avoir fiscal.145   
In 1993, Marion SA distributed dividends to the bank after deducting 25 per cent French 
withholding tax.  The bank applied to the French tax administration for a partial refund 
of the withholding tax and a reimbursement of the avoir fiscal tax credit under France-
United Kingdom double tax treaty. 
 
 
Figure 7: The Bank of Scotland case 
                                                 
143 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect 
to Taxes on Income, Fr.-U.K., art. 9(6), May 22, 1968, 725 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Fr.-U.K. Convention].  
It provided: ‘Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of France to a resident of the United 
Kingdom may be taxed in the United Kingdom.  Such dividends may also be taxed in France but where 
such dividends are beneficially owned by a resident of the United Kingdom the tax so charged shall not 
exceed: 
(a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company which controls the 
company paying those dividends; 
(b) in all other cases 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividend’. 
144 Id.at art. 9(7).  The relevant part of art. 9(7) provided ‘A resident of the United Kingdom who receives 
from a company which is a resident of France dividends which, if received by a resident of France, would 
entitle such resident to a fiscal credit (avoir fiscal), shall be entitled to a payment from the French Treasury 
equal to such credit (avoir fiscal) subject to the deduction of the tax provided for in sub-paragraph (b) of 
paragraph (6) of this Article.’ 
145 Id. at art. 10(2)(b). 
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The French tax administration denied the request on the grounds that the Bank of 
Scotland was not the beneficial owner of the dividends.  The tax administration 
characterised the transaction as a loan made by the bank to Pharmaceuticals Inc, which 
was repaid by the dividends from Marion SA. 
The Supreme Administrative Court ruled in favour of the French tax administration.  
The court reasoned that the France-United Kingdom double tax treaty146 entitled only 
the beneficial owner of dividends to both a refund of withholding tax and a 
reimbursement of the avoir fiscal.  After analysing the contractual arrangements that 
comprised the usufruct, the court was of the opinion that Pharmaceuticals Inc was the 
beneficial owner of the dividends.  Further, the price that the Bank of Scotland paid to 
Pharmaceuticals in consideration for the three-year dividend stream from Marion SA 
was in effect a loan, with the dividend stream repaying both interest and principal.  That 
is, Pharmaceuticals Inc had delegated the repayment of the loan to Marion SA.147 The 
court found that the sole purpose of the agreement was to obtain the benefit of avoir 
                                                 
146Id. 
147 Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie v Société Bank of Scotland, 9 I.T.L.R. 683, 703 
(2006). 
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fiscal tax credit available under the France-United Kingdom tax treaty,148 which was 
not available under the corresponding treaty between France and the United States.149 
The outcome has a certain irony.  The Supreme Administrative Court refused treaty 
benefits to the Bank of Scotland because it considered that the bank was not the 
beneficial owner of the dividends.  That is, the court denied to the bank both (a) the 
reduced treaty rate on dividends and (b) a refund of the avoir fiscal.  Had the parties not 
put the scheme into effect, and had Marion SA simply paid dividends to its shareholder, 
Pharmaceuticals Inc, the dividends would have qualified for the France-United States 
treaty rate, which, as mentioned, was 15 per cent, the same rate as under the France-
United Kingdom treaty.  By trying both to have its cake (a reduced treaty rate on 
dividends) and to eat it (a refund of the avoir fiscal) the bank lost both benefits.  The 
case is an example of a tax planning own goal. 
A theoretical argument might have partially saved the day for the Bank of Scotland.  As 
mentioned, the court denied the 15 per cent France-United Kingdom treaty rate to the 
bank because the bank was not the beneficial owner of the dividends.  But the beneficial 
owner was in the wings, namely Pharmaceuticals Inc, of the United States.  It follows 
that in principle the dividends qualified to be taxed at 15 per cent by virtue of the France-
United States treaty.  The Bank of Scotland does not seem to have advanced this 
argument before the Supreme Administrative Court.  No doubt the argument would 
have failed, if only because France delivers relevant treaty benefits not by reducing 
initial withholding tax but by refunding the taxpayer who has suffered the withholding 
in question.  In the Bank of Scotland case that taxpayer was the bank, not 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
6.10  Would The German Section 50d(3) Have Worked in the Facts and Circumstances of The 
Bank Of Scotland Case? 
If the Bank of Scotland (or a taxpayer in a corresponding position) were to employ the 
scheme in the Bank of Scotland case to obtain benefits under a German tax treaty, it is 
possible that the bank, as a foreign company, would be allowed a withholding tax 
reduction by virtue of the business activity test under section 50d(3) ESTG.  On the 
assumption that the Bank of Scotland’s  structure  and  business  remained  as  it  was  at  the  
time of the Pharmaceuticals Inc-Marion SA scheme, it would seem that the bank would 
satisfy the conditions of that provision.  The Bank of Scotland was involved in a 
business activity and earned more than 10 per cent of its gross income from that 
business activity.  It had business premises, and it participated in general commerce.  
Although there were no economic or other relevant reasons for interposing the bank 
into the investment structure, seemingly the bank would still be entitled to treaty 
benefits because its shares were traded substantially and regularly on a recognised stock 
exchange, or, at least, they were at the time of the case.  
This result appears to be contrary to the policy of double tax treaties.  The bank could 
not be considered to be the owner of the income in a substantive economic sense, 
regardless of the fact that it was involved in genuine business activity.  
This analysis demonstrates that although the absence of business activity may establish 
that an intermediary is a mere conduit the converse is not necessarily true.  The fact that 
                                                 
148 Fr.-U.K. Convention, supra note 143. 
149 Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Fr., Aug. 31, 1994, 1963 U.N.T.S. 67. 
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an intermediary is involved in business activity does not necessarily show that it is not 
acting as a conduit or, to avoid the double negative, a company may act as a mere 
conduit even though it carries on substantive business activity. 
7. REFORM AND CONCLUSION 
7.1  The OECD Discussion Draft of April 29 2011 
The question of conduit companies has remained under official review for some years.  
In 1987 the OECD published the Conduit Companies Report.150 The Commentary to 
the OECD Model Tax Convention and the Model itself, are always the subject of study.  
On April 29, 2011 the OECD published a Discussion Draft on the Clarification of the 
Meaning of ‘Beneficial Owner’.151  However, it is submitted that, while reform is 
necessary, prospects of progress are modest at best if policy makers follow the approach 
in the discussion draft. 
Among the fundamental problems that this article addresses, two stand out: the 
illogicality of accepting activity as an indicium of ownership; and the problem of 
deciding between legal and substantive perspectives of corporations, especially 
corporations that act as conduit companies.  As the authors read it, the OECD discussion 
draft of 2011152 does not address the first of these problems, the illogicality of accepting 
activity as an indicium of ownership.  In short, the discussion draft does not address the 
subject-matter of this article.  The draft thus hobbles its attempts to clarify the meaning 
of ‘beneficial owner’ by failing to address the fundamental illogicality of a test—
substantive business activity—that, as this article demonstrates, is a major component 
of existing attempts to clarify that meaning.  This shortcoming of the draft leads the 
authors to conclude that the draft is likely to shed only limited light on the subject that 
it addresses. 
7.2  The Discussion Draft and Corporate Personality 
While it does not say much about the test of substantive business activity, the draft does, 
at least indirectly, address a related problem of the meaning of ‘beneficial owner’, 
namely the problem of whether treaty law must respect the corporate form, or should 
look past corporate form to discover whether owners of a company are entitled to treaty 
benefits as residents of one of the states that are parties to the treaty in question.  This 
article adverts to that problem in Part 1.2.  Briefly to return to that issue, the authors add 
here a short comment on the manner in which the discussion draft addresses that issue. 
While the draft does have something to say on the point, as the authors read it the draft 
is somewhat imprecise.  One could make the point by referring to a number of parts of 
the draft, but analysis of some of the text of a single example suffices.  Take draft 
paragraph 12.4, which explains that: 
(1) The recipient of a dividend is the ‘beneficial owner’ of that dividend where 
he has the full right to use and enjoy the dividend unconstrained by a 
contractual or legal obligation to pass the payment on to another person.  [Note 
in passing the false dichotomy between ‘contractual’ and ‘legal’.  What 
obligation is ‘contractual’ but not ‘legal’?]  (2) Such an obligation will 
                                                 
150 Conduit Companies Report, supra note 14. 
151 OECD COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, supra note 25. 
152 Id. 
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normally derive from relevant legal documents (3) but may also be found to 
exist  on  the  basis  of  facts  and  circumstances  …  showing  that,  in  substance,  
the recipient clearly does not have the full right to use and enjoy the dividend; 
(4) also, the use and enjoyment of a dividend must be distinguished from legal 
ownership  ….  [Numbers added for purposes of discussion]. 
Let us call each numbered section a ‘text’.  Text 1, referring to enjoyment, defines 
‘beneficial ownership’ in terms of legal ownership.  But text 4 says that enjoyment of a 
dividend must be distinguished from legal ownership.  Text 3 tells us that enjoyment 
may exist as a matter of fact, without legal rights 
The observation in text 3 is helpful until one compares text 3 with text 1, since text 3 
seems to suggest that full factual enjoyment is correctly called ‘beneficial ownership’, 
and until one at the same time compares text 3 with draft paragraph 12.5, which says 
that, ‘The  concept  of  ‘beneficial  owner’  deals  with  some  forms  of  tax  avoidance  (i.e., 
those involving the interposition of a recipient who is obliged to pass the dividend to 
someone  else)  …’.  That is, draft paragraph 12.5 uses ‘beneficial owner’ to refer to a 
legal owner who is nevertheless obliged to act as a conduit. 
Now compare text 1, on one hand, with text 2 and text 3 on the other.  Text 1 refers to 
a recipient who enjoys a category of benefit that is ‘unconstrained by a contractual or 
legal obligation’.  That is, text 1 locates itself in the context of legal obligations and 
legal freedoms and powers.  The recipient has legal freedom or power to enjoy the 
dividend and no inconsistent legal obligation constrains that freedom or power.  Text 2 
occupies the same territory; the recipient derives her freedoms and powers from 
‘relevant legal documents’.  In contrast, text 3 identifies an agent (in the sense of an 
actor, not in the legal sense of the complement of a principal) who is not the recipient 
but who, nevertheless, enjoys dominion over the dividends in question.  Unlike the 
recipients in texts 1 and 2, the recipient in text 3 does not enjoy such dominion; instead, 
the recipient is subject to an obligation to pass the dividend on to the agent.  But text 
3’s enjoyment by the agent is not based in law; the enjoyment is factual and 
circumstantial, in short, substantive.  Likewise, for reasons of substance, not of law, the 
recipient itself does not enjoy dominion over the dividends that it receives.  That is, text 
2 and text 3 address concepts that differ (law and substance) and address recipients that 
differ in respect of the dominion that they enjoy over dividends that they receive: 
dominion for the recipient in respect of text 2, but no dominion in respect of text 3. 
The inference to be drawn from the analysis in the previous paragraph is that the 
categories that are the subjects of text 2 and text 3 can be interpreted sensibly only as 
mutually exclusive sub-sets of the category that is the subject of text 1.  But this 
inference makes sense in respect of text 2 only.  The subject matter of text 1 locates 
itself in the territory of law, as does the subject matter of text 2.  That is, text 2 can 
logically form a sub-set of text 1.  But the subject matter of text 3 relates to fact, 
circumstance, and substance, not to law.  The subject matter of text 3 cannot be a sub-
set of the subject matter of text 1, either linguistically or logically. 
It is not enough to say in defence of the draft, ‘The language may be loose, but we know 
what the Committee on Fiscal Affairs intends’.  As first sight, that may appear to be so.  
But the analysis in the foregoing paragraphs shows that no, the draft is not coherent 
enough for us to know what the Committee intends; the  Committee’s  meaning slides 
elusively from one signification to another.  This result is unsurprising.  When people 
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try to use the same language to express opposing concepts confusion is almost 
inevitable. 
Is the criticism in the preceding paragraphs ungenerous?  The Committee on Fiscal 
Affairs does its best with the weapons available to it.  But the sword of beneficial 
ownership shatters on the anvil of corporate personality.  If one tries to reduce this area 
of the law to anything resembling a rule or series of rules felicitous results are unlikely. 
7.3  Conclusion 
Although different reports of the OECD and courts substitute the substantive business 
activity test for the beneficial ownership test, that test is not related to the concept of 
ownership at all. 
Originally, courts applied the substantive business activity test to cases involving straw 
companies and base companies.  The focal issue in those cases is whether a corporation 
should be recognised for tax purposes.  Courts considering base companies and straw 
companies considered the presence of substantive business activity to be sufficient to 
recognise a corporation as a separate taxable entity.  Conduit company cases prima facie 
appear similar to straw company cases and base company cases.  Probably for this 
reason, some courts have applied the test of substantive business activity to conduit 
company cases by transplanting the reasoning adopted in cases involving straw 
companies and base companies.  
Unlike cases involving straw companies and base companies conduit company cases 
should be determined in the light of the object and purpose of double tax treaties.  
Although the absence of a business activity indicates that the interposition of an 
intermediary lacks substance for the purpose of qualifying for treaty benefits, its 
presence does not necessarily indicate that the interposition of an intermediary does not 
contradict the object and purpose of a double tax treaty.  It follows that the business 
activity criterion works best as a one-way test in conduit company cases: no business 
activity, no treaty benefit.  But the test cannot logically be applied to qualify a company 
for treaty benefits. 
7.4  Coda 
This article is part of a larger project.  In work to follow, the authors plan to address 
related topics, which include: 
x The surrogate test of dominion. 
x Interpretation of beneficial ownership provisions as non-specific anti-
avoidance provisions. 
x Limitation of benefits provisions. 
x Medium and long-term solutions to the problem of conduit companies. 
The authors will argue that the medium-term solution is to interpret ‘beneficial 
ownership’ according to the apparent objective of those who introduced the concept 
into the text of the OECD Model Convention.  That objective was not to introduce a 
formal, technical, test.  Rather, it was to prevent residents of third countries from 
contriving to take advantage of tax benefits that states that are parties to double tax 
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treaties intend to confer on and to limit to their own residents.153  The objective may be 
achieved by interpreting beneficial ownership provisions as anti-avoidance rules, 
following reasoning reminiscent to the reasoning of the Swiss Federal Court in A 
Holding ApS v Federal Tax Administration,154 which is discussed in part 2 of this article. 
                                                 
153 ‘Extracts from OECD Working Documents of 1968 to 1971 in respect of Beneficial Ownership’, being 
an appendix to a Response by John Avery Jones, Richard Vann, and Joanna Wheeler to ‘OECD Discussion 
Draft,  ‘Clarification  of  the  Meaning  of  ‘Beneficial  Owner’  in  the  OECD Model Tax Convention’, available 
at 
http://www.OECD.org/tax/taxtreaties/publiccommentsreceivedonthediscussiondraftonthemeaningofbenef
icialownerintheOECDmodeltaxconvention.htm, last accessed Aug. 31 2012. 
154 A Holding ApS v. Fed. Tax Admin., 8 I.T.L.R. 536 (2005) (Federal Court, Switz.). 
